during this advisory phase of the proceeding.[18]

Responses to this memorandum and any other responses to information or requests for input from the Advisory PAPO Board must be submitted and served electronically through the NRC's Electronic Information Exchange (EIE) system, docket number PAPO–001. Potential parties that already have been participating in the PAPO proceeding, docket number PAPO–00, and using the EIE system do not need to do anything additional to be able to file in this Advisory PAPO proceeding. Those that have not been participating in the PAPO proceeding but wish to make submissions before this Board should consult the NRC's Web site, which provides detailed instructions on the steps necessary to access and make EIE submissions, including (1) obtaining a digital certificate from the NRC Office of the Secretary and installing that certificate into the participant's Web browser (*http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html*); (2) loading the viewer software currently needed to submit and view documents in the EIE system (*http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/install-viewer.html*); (3) creating a document in the portable document format (PDF) suitable for EIE submission (*http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/electronic-sub-ref-mat.html*); and (4) accessing the EIE Web site and submitting the document (*http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/submit-documents.html*). A potential party that is not currently participating in the PAPO proceeding and using EIE should begin this process no less than five days before it wishes to make an initial submission. In submitting their responses, potential parties should make sure they are filing them on this docket, PAPO–001, which is denominated as the ''Advisory PAPO Board'' on the dropdown list of proceedings that is part of the EIE filing form.

We request that all potential parties (including DOE and the NRC Staff) provide us with a filing that includes the information described above in Part II.A and that in its filing DOE also provide us with the information described above in Part II.B. All filings should be submitted through the agency's EIE system and served on the service list for the Advisory PAPO Board proceeding, docket number PAPO–001, by Monday, March 24, 2008.

[18] We caution that for potential parties that have not already been participating in the PAPO proceeding, docket number PAPO–00, filing a notice of appearance with this Advisory PAPO Board, docket number PAPO–001, will not suffice for participation in the PAPO proceeding.

March 6, 2008, Rockville, Maryland.

The Advisory Pre-License Application, Presiding Officer Board.

Thomas S. Moore,

Chairman, Administrative Judge.

G. Paul Bollwerk, III,

Administrative Judge.

E. Roy Hawkens,

Administrative Judge.

[FR Doc. E8–4918 Filed 3–11–08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Proposed License Renewal Interim Staff Guidance LR–ISG–2008–01: Staff Guidance Regarding the Station Blackout Rule (10 CFR 50.63); Associated With License Renewal Applications; Solicitation of Public Comment

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Solicitation of public comment.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is soliciting public comment on its Proposed License Renewal Interim Staff Guidance LR–ISG–2008–01 (LR–ISG) for clarification to its previously issued LR–ISG–02, ''Staff Guidance on Scoping of Equipment Relied on to Meet the Requirements of the Station Blackout (SBO) Rule (10 CFR 50.63) for License Renewal,'' dated April 1, 2002, which has been incorporated in the License Renewal Standard Review Plan. This LR–ISG provides additional clarification to the staff position on the license renewal scoping requirements regarding the offsite power system for SBO recovery. The NRC staff issues LR–ISGs to facilitate timely implementation of the license renewal rule and to review activities associated with a license renewal application. Upon receiving public comments, the NRC staff will evaluate the comments and make a determination to incorporate the comments, as appropriate. Once the NRC staff completes the LR–ISG, it will issue the LR–ISG for NRC and industry use. The NRC staff will also incorporate the approved LR–ISG into the next revision of the license renewal guidance documents.

DATES: Comments may be submitted by May 12, 2008. Comments received after this date will be considered, if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted to: Chief, Rulemaking, Directives and Editing Branch, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001. Comments should be delivered to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, Room T–6D59, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays. Persons may also provide comments via e-mail at *NRCREP@NRC.GOV.* The NRC maintains an Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's public documents. These documents may be accessed through the NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.* Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by e-mail at *pdr@nrc.gov.*

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Stacie Sakai, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone 301–415–1884 or by e-mail at *sxs11@nrc.gov.*

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Attachment 1 to this **Federal Register** notice, entitled *Staff Position and Rationale for the Proposed License Renewal Interim Staff Guidance LR–ISG–2008–01: Staff Guidance Regarding the Station Blackout Rule (10 CFR 50.63) Associated with License Renewal Applications,*'' contains the NRC staff's rationale for publishing the proposed LR–ISG–2008–01. Attachment 2 to this **Federal Register** notice, entitled *Proposed License Renewal Interim Staff Guidance LR–ISG–2008–01: Staff Guidance Regarding the Station Blackout Rule (10 CFR 50.63) Associated with License Renewal Applications,*'' contains the additional clarification to the current staff position on the license renewal SBO scoping requirements.

The NRC staff is issuing this notice to solicit public comments on the proposed LR–ISG–2008–01. After the NRC staff considers any public comments, it will make a determination regarding issuance of the proposed LR–ISG.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 5th day of March, 2008.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Pao-Tsin Kuo,

Director, Division of License Renewal, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Attachment 1—Staff Position and Rationale for the Proposed License Renewal Interim Staff Guidance LR–ISG–2008–01: Staff Guidance Regarding the Station Blackout Rule (10 CFR 50.63) Associated With License Renewal Applications

Staff Position

Consistent with the requirements specified in Title 10, § 54.4(a)(3), of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR 54.4(a)(3)) and 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1), the scope of license renewal should include the offsite recovery path from the transmission system to the Class 1E distribution system. Accordingly, the offsite recovery paths that must be included within the scope of license renewal, in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3), consist of circuits from two independent sources. Both paths start from the switchyard breaker to the plant Class 1E safety buses. This path includes (1) switchyard circuit breakers that connect to the offsite power system (i.e., grid), (2) power transformers, (3) intervening overhead or underground circuits (i.e., cables, buses and connections, transmission conductors and connections, insulators, disconnect switches, and associated components), (4) circuits between the circuit breakers and power transformers, (5) circuits between the power transformers and onsite electrical distribution system, and (6) the associated control circuits and structures.

Rationale

The license renewal rule, 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3), requires that the scope of license renewal include ''All systems, structures, and components relied on in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with the Commission's regulations for * * * station blackout (10 CFR 50.63).'' The station blackout (SBO) rule, 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1), states that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant licensed to operate must be able to withstand and recover from an SBO of a specified duration that is based on factors that include ''(iii) The expected frequency of loss of offsite power; and (iv) The probable time needed to restore offsite power.'' In this regard, the SBO rule is consistent with the staff findings identified in the statement of considerations for the SBO rule and NUREG–1032, ''Evaluation of Station Blackout Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants,'' issued June 1988.

During its evaluation of licensee compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.63, ''Loss of All Alternating Current Power,'' the staff has assessed the offsite power recovery paths that are credited in the licensee evaluation of SBO coping duration. The SBO coping duration evaluation is based on the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1). The staff's regulatory assessment and acceptance of licensees' compliance with the SBO rule for offsite power is based on the site-related characteristics and power design characteristics as defined in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, ''Station Blackout,'' issued August 1988, and also the availability and reliability of the offsite power including the protective coordination of switchyard breakers. The staff developed this guidance to ensure that scoping of SBO equipment in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) is conducted in a manner consistent with the original staff evaluations of licensee compliance with the requirements of the SBO rule (10 CFR 50.63) to include equipment necessary for recovery.

Attachment 2—Proposed License Renewal Interim Staff Guidance LR–ISG–2008–01: Staff Guidance Regarding the Station Blackout Rule (10 CFR 50.63) Associated with License Renewal Applications

Staff Position

Consistent with the requirements specified in Title 10, § 54.4(a)(3), of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR 54.4(a)(3)) and 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1), the scope of license renewal should include the offsite recovery path from the transmission system to the Class 1E distribution system. The offsite and onsite power circuits must permit functioning of structures, systems, and components necessary to respond to the event. The rationale for this position follows.

Rationale

In the license renewal rule, 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) requires that the scope of license renewal include ''All systems, structures, and components relied on in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with the Commission's regulations for * * * station blackout (10 CFR 50.63).'' In the station blackout (SBO) rule, 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1), states that each light-water-cooled nuclear power plant licensed to operate must be able to withstand and recover from an SBO of a specified duration that is based on factors that include ''(iii) The expected frequency of loss of offsite power; and (iv) The probable time needed to restore offsite power.'' In this regard, the SBO rule is consistent with the staff findings identified in the statement of considerations and NUREG–1032, ''Evaluation of Station Blackout Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants,'' issued June 1988. In particular, with regard to factor (iv), the staff found that restoration of offsite power (0.6 hours median time to restore) is more likely to terminate an SBO event than restoration of the emergency diesel generators (8 hours median time to repair).

In Appendix A, ''General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' to 10 CFR part 50, ''Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,'' General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, ''Electric Power Systems,'' requires that two physically independent circuits shall supply electric power from the transmission network to the onsite electric distribution system. These circuits must be designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. A switchyard common to both circuits is acceptable. Each of these circuits shall be designed to be available soon enough after a loss of all onsite alternating current (ac) power supplies and the loss of the other offsite electric power circuit to ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. One of these circuits (the immediate access circuit) shall be designed to be available within a few seconds following a loss-of-coolant accident to ensure the maintenance of core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safety functions.

Plants not licensed in accordance with GDC 17 were licensed to satisfy plant-specific principal design criteria presented in the plant updated final safety analysis report (FSAR). These criteria are similar to GDC 17. The electric grid is the source of power to the offsite power system. Therefore, all operating plants have offsite power requirements similar to GDC 17. The plant technical specifications embody the operational restrictions for the design requirements for the loss of offsite power sources.

SBO is the loss of offsite and onsite ac electric power to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses in a nuclear power plant. It does not include the loss of ac power fed from inverters powered by station batteries or loss of ac power from an alternate ac power source. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission added the SBO rule to the

regulations in 10 CFR part 50 because, as operating experience accumulated, concern arose that the reliability of both the offsite and onsite ac power systems might be less than originally anticipated, even for designs that met the requirements of GDC 17 and GDC 18, ''Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems.'' The results of risk studies indicate that estimated core melt frequencies from SBOs vary considerably between plants and could be a significant risk contributor for some plants.

As a result, the SBO rule required that nuclear power plants have the capability to withstand and recover from the loss of offsite and onsite ac power of a specified duration (the coping duration). In their plant evaluations, licensees followed the guidance specified in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, ''Station Blackout,'' issued August 1988, and NUMARC 87–00, ''Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors,'' to determine their required plant-specific coping duration. The agency based the criteria specified in RG 1.155 to calculate a plant-specific coping duration on the expected frequency of loss of offsite power and the probable time needed to restore offsite power, as well as the other two factors (onsite emergency ac power source redundancy and reliability) specified in 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1). In requiring that a plant's coping duration be based in part on the probable time needed to restore offsite power, 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1) specifies that the offsite power system be an assumed method of recovering from an SBO. Disregarding the offsite power system as a means of recovering from an SBO would not meet the requirements of the 10 CFR 50.63 rule and would result in a longer required coping duration.

The use of the offsite power system within 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1) as a means of recovering from an SBO should not be construed to be the only acceptable means of recovering from an SBO. A licensee could, for example, recover offsite power or emergency (onsite) power. It is not possible to determine before an actual SBO event which source of power can be returned first. As a result, 10 CFR 50.63(c)(1)(ii) and its associated guidance in RG 1.155, Sections 1.3 and 2, require procedures to recover from an SBO that include restoration of offsite and onsite power.

Based on the above, licensees rely on both the offsite and onsite power systems to meet the requirements of the SBO rule. Elements of both offsite and onsite power are necessary to determine the required coping duration under 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1), and the procedures required by 10 CFR 50.63(c)(1)(ii) must address both offsite power and onsite power restoration. It follows, therefore, that both systems are used to demonstrate compliance with the SBO rule and must be included within the scope of license renewal consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). The onsite power system is included within the scope of license renewal on the basis of the requirements under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1) (safety-related systems). The equipment that is relied upon to cope with an SBO (e.g., alternate ac power sources) is included within the scope of license renewal on the basis of the requirements under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). The offsite power system is therefore necessary to complete the required scope of the electrical power systems under license renewal.

The staff has recently noted during the review of license renewal applications that some applicants have not included all of the components and structures within the scope of license renewal needed for recovering the offsite source from an SBO event as required by 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3). Failure to include all of the structures and components within the scope of license renewal will result in those structures and components not being subject to aging management review, and the effects of aging will not be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the current licensing basis for the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1) and (a)(3).

During its evaluation of licensee compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.63, ''Loss of All Alternating Current Power,'' the staff has assessed the offsite power recovery paths that are credited in the licensee evaluation of SBO coping duration. The SBO coping duration evaluation is based on the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.63(a)(1). The staff's regulatory assessment and acceptance of licensees' compliance with the SBO rule for offsite power is based on the site-related characteristics and power design characteristics as defined in RG 1.155, and also the availability and reliability of the offsite power including the protective coordination of switchyard breakers.

The offsite power systems of U.S. nuclear power plants consist of a transmission system component and a switchyard that provides a source of power and a plant system component that connects that power source to a plant's onsite electrical distribution system which powers safety equipment. The staff considers each plant design individually, reviewing the plant's FSAR and associated electrical drawings. The key to performing the scoping for the SBO recovery path is defining the boundary of the offsite power source at the switchyard. A switchyard can have multiple offsite lines supplying the switchyard buses. Although switchyard designs vary, most plants have either a ring bus or breaker-and-a-half scheme.

The scoping boundary, as outlined in the Standard Review Plan-License Renewal (SRP–LR), Section 2.5.2.1.1, should be from the breaker or breakers from the switchyard (connections to the line side). If there is a circuit breaker between the power transformer (startup, reserve, auxiliary, or main transformer) and the switchyard bus, and the circuit breaker is directly bolted to the switchyard bus, then that circuit breaker is acceptable as the scoping boundary. If there is a disconnect switch, but no circuit breaker exists between the transformer and the switchyard bus, then the circuit breaker(s) connected to the switchyard bus that feeds the power transformer (startup, reserve, auxiliary, or main transformer) should be acceptable as the scoping boundary.

The circuit breaker, as the scoping boundary, provides connection to offsite power via the switchyard bus, which can be powered by any of the incoming transmission lines. This breaker should be at the transmission system voltage to ensure adequate protection of safety bus and the recovery of offsite power. The staff believes that the circuit breaker needs to be within the scope of license renewal because of its ability to provide plant power, protect downstream circuits and provide plant operator-controlled isolation and energization ability. In addition, a circuit breaker coordinates with other protective devices to minimize the probability of loss of offsite power and prevent transients from affecting the onsite distribution system as offsite power is being restored. For these reasons, a circuit breaker remains as the scoping boundary. Using a disconnect switch or other component downstream of the breaker is not consistent with the staff position of compliance with the SBO rule and is not acceptable for meeting the SBO scoping requirements for license renewal.

As discussed above, for purposes of the license renewal, the staff has determined that the offsite recovery paths that must be included within the scope of license renewal, in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3), consist of circuits from two independent sources. Both paths start from the switchyard breaker to the plant Class 1E safety

buses. This path includes (1) switchyard circuit breakers that connect to the offsite power system (i.e., grid), (2) power transformers, (3) intervening overhead or underground circuits (i.e., cables, buses and connections, transmission conductors and connections, insulators, disconnect switches, and associated components), (4) circuits between the circuit breakers and power transformers, (5) circuits between the power transformers and onsite electrical distribution system, and (6) control circuit cables and connections and structures associated with components in the recovery path. The SBO recovery path scoping boundary ends at the line side of the switchyard breaker(s) at transmission system voltage. For the switchyard breakers, bolted connections to the switchyard bus and structural components supporting the breakers are within the scope of license renewal. The control circuit cables and its connections for the switchyard breakers are not within the scope of license renewal. Figures of different configurations of the SBO offsite power recovery path that are acceptable to the staff and meet the license renewal scoping requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) are available via ADAMS at Accession No. ML080520620.

The ownership of switchyard components is not a factor in ensuring that the effects of aging will be adequately managed for components and structures needed for recovering the offsite circuits from an SBO event consistent with the requirements in 10 CFR 54.4, ''Scope,'' and 10 CFR 54.21, ''Contents of Application—Technical Information.'' The staff recognizes that there are interface and control agreements between the licensee and transmission system operator. These agreements do not preclude the applicant from complying with requirements specified in 10 CFR 54.4 and 10 CFR 54.21.

Designating the appropriate offsite power system long-lived passive structures and components that are part of this circuit path as subject to an aging management review will ensure the maintenance of the bases underlying the SBO requirements over the period of the extended license. This is consistent with the Commission's expectations in including the SBO event under 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3) of the license renewal rule.

[FR Doc. E8–4902 Filed 3–11–08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

Proposed Data Collection Available for Public Comment and Recommendations

Summary: In accordance with the requirement of Section 3506(c)(2)(A) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 which provides opportunity for public comment on new or revised data collections, the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) will publish periodic summaries of proposed data collections.

Comments are invited on: (a) Whether the proposed information collection is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information has practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the RRB's estimate of the burden of the collection of the information; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden related to the collection of information on respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

Title and purpose of information collection: Statement of Authority to Act for Employee; OMB 3220–0034.

Under Section 5(a) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA), claims for benefits are to be made in accordance with such regulations as the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) shall prescribe. The provisions for claiming sickness benefits as provided by Section 2 of the RUIA are prescribed in 20 CFR 335.2. Included in these provisions is the RRB's acceptance of forms executed by someone else on behalf of an employee if the RRB is satisfied that the employee is sick or injured to the extent of being unable to sign forms.

The RRB utilizes Form SI–10, Statement of Authority to Act for Employee, to provide the means for an individual to apply for authority to act on behalf of an incapacitated employee and also to obtain the information necessary to determine that the delegation should be made. Part I of the form is completed by the applicant for the authority and Part II is completed by the employee's doctor. One response is requested of each respondent. Completion is required to obtain benefits. The RRB proposes no changes to Form SI–10.

The estimated annual respondent burden is as follows:

Form: SI–10.

Estimate of Annual Responses: 400.

Estimated Completion Time: 6 minutes.

Total Burden Hours: 40.

Additional Information or Comments: To request more information or to obtain a copy of the information collection justification, forms, and/or supporting material, please call the RRB Clearance Officer at (312) 751–3363 or send an e-mail request to *Charles.Mierzwa@RRB.GOV*. Comments regarding the information collection should be addressed to Ronald J. Hodapp, Railroad Retirement Board, 844 North Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611–2092 or send an e-mail to *Ronald.Hodapp@RRB.GOV*. Written comments should be received within 60 days of this notice.

Charles Mierzwa,

Clearance Officer.

[FR Doc. E8–4910 Filed 3–11–08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7905–01–P

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

Agency Forms Submitted for OMB Review, Request for Comments

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35), the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) is forwarding an Information Collection Request (ICR) to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to request a revision to a currently approved collection of information: 3220–0195, Statement Regarding Contributions and Support of Children. Our ICR describes the information we seek to collect from the public. Review and approval by OIRA ensures that we impose appropriate paperwork burdens.

The RRB invites comments on the proposed collection of information to determine (1) the practical utility of the collection; (2) the accuracy of the estimated burden of the collection; (3) ways to enhance the quality, utility and clarity of the information that is the subject of collection; and (4) ways to minimize the burden of collections on respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology. Comments to RRB or OIRA must contain the OMB control number of the ICR. For proper consideration of your comments, it is best if RRB and OIRA receive them within 30 days of publication date.

Section 2(d)(4) of the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA), provides, in part, that a child is deemed dependent if the conditions set forth in Section 202(d)(3), (4) and (9) of the Social Security Act are met. Section 202(d)(4) of the Social Security Act, as amended by Public Law 104–121, requires as a condition of dependency, that a child receives one-half of his or her support from the stepparent. This dependency impacts