Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Bombardier Model DHC-8-102, DHC-8-103, and DHC-8-106 airplanes and Model DHC-8-200 and DHC-8-300 series airplanes; certificated in any category; serial numbers 003 through 579 inclusive.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from reports of broken or damaged main landing gear (MLG) and nose landing gear (NLG) alternate release cables caused by rubbing and fraying at the cable-to-handle interface. We are issuing this AD to prevent breakage of the MLG and NLG alternate release cables, which, if the normal gear extension fails, could result in the inability to extend the MLG or NLG and consequent collapse of the landing gear during ground maneuvers or upon landing.

Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

Modification

(f) Within 3,000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, modify the MLG and NLG handle assemblies for alternate release and the MLG retaining plate, do the related investigative action, and the corrective action if applicable, by accomplishing all the applicable actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 8–32–146, Revision 'D,' dated February 7, 2003. Do the corrective action, if applicable, before further flight.

Actions Accomplished According to Previous Issue of Service Bulletin

(g) Actions accomplished before the effective date of this AD in accordance with Bombardier Service Bulletin 8–32–146, dated September 10, 1999; Revision 'A,' dated January 17, 2001; Revision 'B,' dated June 25, 2001; or Revision 'C,' dated January 24, 2003; are considered acceptable for compliance with the corresponding action specified in this AD.

Parts Installation

- (h) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install any part specified in paragraphs (h)(1), (h)(2), and (h)(3) of this AD, on any airplane.
- (1) MLG handle assembly, part number (P/N) 83260042.
 - (2) NLG handle assembly, P/N 83260020.
 - (3) MLG retaining plate, P/N 83260043.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

- (i)(1) The Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
- (2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards Certificate Holding District Office.

Related Information

(j) Canadian airworthiness directive CF–2006–09, issued May 8, 2006, also addresses the subject of this AD.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 21, 2006.

Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E6–22534 Filed 1–5–07; 8:45 am] **BILLING CODE 4910–13–P**

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2006-26726; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-205-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747–400F Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747–400F series airplanes. This proposed AD would require installing drains and drain tubes to eliminate water accumulation in the dripshield above the M826 Card File in the main equipment center. This proposed AD results from a report that water from the dripshield entered the card file and damaged a circuit card, causing the AFT CARGO FIRE MSG message to be illuminated and resulting in an air turn back. We are proposing this AD to prevent water from entering the card file and damaging a circuit card. Failure of one or more of the 15 fuel system circuit cards in the card file could cause loss of fuel management, which could cause unavailability of fuel. Failure of one or more of the 35 fire detection circuit cards could cause a false message of a fire, or no message of a fire when there is a fire.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by February 22, 2007. **ADDRESSES:** Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this proposed AD.

- DOT Docket Web site: Go to http://dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
- Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590.
 - Fax: (202) 493-2251.
- Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207, for the service information identified in this proposed

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Marcia Smith, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM–150S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6484; fax (425) 917–6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed in the ADDRESSES section. Include the docket number "FAA—2006—26726; Directorate Identifier 2006—NM—205—AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the proposed AD in light of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–78), or you may visit http:// dms.dot.gov.

Examining the Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them.

Discussion

We have received a report of the AFT CARGO FIRE MSG message illuminating in the cockpit of a Boeing Model 747–400F series airplane, resulting in an air turn back. An investigation revealed no signs of actual fire. Investigation found water dripping onto and around the dripshield located over the M826 Card File in the main equipment center at station 400. Due to the amount of water, the dripshield was not able to prevent water from entering the card file and damaging a circuit card. Circuit cards subject to damage in

that location are fire detection, fuel system, and electrical system cards. This condition, if not corrected, could result in water entering the card file and damaging a circuit card. Failure of one or more of the 15 fuel system circuit cards in the card file could cause loss of fuel management, which could cause unavailability of fuel. Failure of one or more of the 35 fire detection circuit cards could cause a false message of a fire, or no message of a fire when there is a fire.

Relevant Service Information

We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–25A3370, Revision 1, dated April 27, 2006. The alert service bulletin describes procedures for installing two drains and drain tubes in the dripshield above the M826 Card File. Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD

We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of this same type design. For this reason, we are proposing this AD, which would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously.

Costs of Compliance

There are about 86 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The following table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to comply with this proposed AD.

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action	Work hours	Average labor rate per hour	Parts	Cost per airplane	Number of U.Sreg- istered airplanes	Fleet cost
Installation	8	\$80	\$822	\$1,462	21	\$30,702

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, "General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed regulation:

- 1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
- 2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
- 3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the **ADDRESSES** section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

Boeing: Docket No. FAA-2006-26726; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-205-AD.

Comments Due Date

(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by February 22, 2007.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 747–400F series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–25A3370, Revision 1, dated April 27, 2006.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from a report that water from the dripshield entered the card file and damaged a circuit card, causing the AFT CARGO FIRE MSG message to be illuminated and resulting in an air turn back. We are issuing this AD to prevent water from entering the card file and damaging a circuit card. Failure of one or more of the 15 fuel system circuit cards in the card file could cause loss of fuel management, which could cause unavailability of fuel. Failure of one or more of the 35 fire detection circuit cards could cause a false message of a fire, or no message of a fire when there is a fire.

Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

Installation

(f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, install two drains and drain tubes in the dripshield above the M826 Card File over the nose wheel left side in the main equipment center at station 400, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–25A3370, Revision 1, dated April 27, 2006.

Installation According to Previous Issue of Service Bulletin

(g) Installing the drains and drain tubes is also acceptable for compliance with the requirements of paragraph (f) of this AD if done before the effective date of this AD in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–25A3370, dated September 8, 2005.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards Certificate Holding District Office.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 12, 2006.

Ali Bahrami.

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E6–22535 Filed 1–5–07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2003-SW-37-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; MD Helicopters, Inc. Model 369A, 369D, 369E, 369F, 369FF, 369H, 369HE, 369HS, 369HM, 500N, and OH–6A Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking; reopening of comment period.

SUMMARY: This document revises an earlier proposed airworthiness directive (AD) for MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI)

Model 369A, 369D, 369E, 369F, 369FF, 369H, 369HE, 369HS, 369HM, 500N, and OH-6A helicopters that would have required replacing or reworking certain forward (fwd) and aft landing gear assemblies. That proposal was prompted by five reports of landing gear strut (strut) failures. This action revises that action by proposing to mandate both the creation of an access hole to facilitate inspections and a recurring inspection. The proposed AD also would exclude from the applicability certain helicopters modified with a certain Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) and would provide a terminating action for the proposed requirements. This proposal also includes clarifying changes. The actions specified by this proposed AD are intended to detect a crack that could result in the failure of a strut and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter during landing.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before March 9, 2007.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, Attention: Rules Docket No. 2003–SW–37–AD, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137. You may also send comments electronically to the Rules Docket at the following address: 9-asw-adcomments@faa.gov. Comments may be inspected at the Office of the Regional Counsel between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from MD Helicopters Inc., Attn: Customer Support Division, 4555 E. McDowell Rd., Mail Stop M615, Mesa, Arizona 85215–9734, telephone 1–800–388–3378, fax 480–346–6813, or on the web at http://www.mdhelicopters.com. This information may be examined at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Cecil, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Airframe Branch, 3960 Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, California 90712–4137, telephone (562) 627–5228, fax (562) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to

the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this document may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their mailed comments submitted in response to this proposal must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. 2003–SW–37–AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Discussion

A proposal to amend 14 CFR part 39 to add an AD for the specified MDHI model helicopters was published in the Federal Register on August 4, 2004 (69 FR 47040). That proposal would have required removing all landing gear fairings; determining the number and location of rivets that attach the landing gear fairing support assembly to the landing gear strut; and if three rivets (fwd, aft and inboard) are present, replacing or reworking the landing gear assembly. If only the fwd and aft rivets are present, no rework would be required by the proposed AD. That proposal was prompted by five reports of strut failures. Operators of the helicopters with failed struts do not fall into any clear category of service. For example, one was a tour operator in Niagara Falls, New York and another was a police department operator in Calgary, Canada. In its original design, the fairing support was attached to the strut with three rivets (forward, aft, and outboard). In 1994, the manufacturer released a design change to attach the fairing support assembly with only forward and aft rivets because of the possibility of reduced service life of the strut if the third rivet was located on the inboard side of the strut. Some landing gear struts entered service with an additional rivet hole drilled on the inboard side of the strut. This additional rivet hole results in decreased fatigue strength of the strut and subsequent