2. Expected Respondents

The expected respondents are project directors and/or managers of all 27 projects; LSAMP graduates who received program funding and who earned STEM baccalaureate degrees between 1992 and 1997; and, faculty, staff, and student participants at the three selected case study sites.

3. Burden on the Public

The total elements for this collection are 308 burden hours for a maximum of 795 participants annually, assuming a 90-100% response rate. The average annual reporting burden is under 1 hour per respondent. The burden on the public is negligible because the study is limited to project participants that have received funding from the LSAMP Program.

Dated: March 11, 2002.

Suzanne H. Plimpton,

Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation.

[FR Doc. 02–6283 Filed 3–14–02; 8:45 am]

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Advisory Committee for Environmental Research and Education; Notice of Meeting

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public Law 92–463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the following meeting:

Name: Advisory Committee for Environmental Research and Education (9487).

Dates: April 3, 2002, 9 a.m.–5:30 p.m. and April 4, 9 a.m.–2:30 p.m.

**Place: Stafford II Annex, Room 555, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA.

Type of Meeting: Open.

Contact Person: Dr. Margaret Cavanaugh, Office of the Director, National Science Foundation, Suite 1205, 4201 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, Virginia 22230. Phone 703–292–8002.

Minutes: May be obtained from the contact person listed above.

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice, recommendations, and oversight concerning support for environmental research and education.

Agenda

April 3

AM

Panel Discussion: Building a Diverse Workforce in Environmental Science, Engineering, Education, and Technology Update on NSF Activities

General Discussion of Outline/Draft Decadal Plan Modifications of Outline/Draft Decadal Plan: Small Group Meetings

April 4

AM

Meeting with Director: (Tentative) Approval of Specific Modifications to Outline/Draft Decadal Plan

PM

Trends and Opportunities in Research & Education: Tom Graedel Plans for Vetting and Publication of Decadal Plan and Wrap-up

Dated: March 12, 2002.

Susanne Bolton,

Committee Management Officer. [FR Doc. 02–6282 Filed 3–14–02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7555–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-260 and 50-296]

Tennessee Valley Authority; Browns Ferry Plant, Units 2 and 3; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is considering
issuance of an exemption from Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) Part 50, Appendix G, for Facility
Operating License Nos. DPR–52 and
DPR–68, issued to Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA, the licensee), for
operation of the Browns Ferry Plant,
located in Limestone county Alabama.
Therefore, as required by 10 CFR 51.21,
the NRC is issuing this environmental
assessment and finding of no significant
impact.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action would allow TVA to apply the methodologies of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N–640, "Alternative Requirement Fracture Toughness for Development of P–T [Pressure-Temperature] Limit Curves for ASME B&PV [Boiler and Pressure Vessel] Code, Section XI, Division 1," for the Browns Ferry Plant reactor vessel circumferential welds.

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated August 17, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated December 14, 2001, and February 6, 2002.

The Need for the Proposed Action

Appendix G of 10 CFR part 50, requires that P–T limits be established for reactor pressure vessels during normal operating and hydrostatic pressure or leak-testing conditions.

Specifically, 10 CFR part 50, Appendix G, states that "The appropriate requirements on both the pressure-temperature limits and the minimum permissible temperature must be met for all conditions." Appendix G further specifies that the requirements for these limits are the ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix G, limits.

To address the provisions of amendments to the Technical Specifications P–T limits, the licensee requested in its submittals that the staff exempt Browns Ferry Units 2 and 3 from the application of the specific requirements of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix G, and permit the use of ASME Code Case N–640. Code Case N–640 permits the use of an alternate reference fracture toughness for reactor vessel materials in determining P–T limits

Application of the methodology specified in Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME Code for the development of facility P-T limits may not be necessary to meet the underlying purpose of the regulations, which is to protect the reactor coolant pressure boundary from brittle fracture. To satisfy this purpose, the staff had previously required the use of the conservative assumptions in Appendix G to 10 CFR part 50, because the conservatism was initially necessary due to the limited knowledge of the fracture toughness of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) materials at that time. Since 1974, additional knowledge has been gained about RPV materials which demonstrates that the lower bound on fracture toughness resulting from the application of this ASME Code Case would greatly exceed the margin of safety required to protect the public and safety from potential RPV failures. Exemptions to employ an alternative to the methodology specified in Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME Code which result in the development of less conservative P-T limits may be granted by the NRC staff. The use of ASME Code Case N-640 represents one of these alternatives.

Licensees may request the use of alternative methodologies which continue to meet the underlying intent of the regulations for many reasons. Regarding Browns Ferry Plant, application of the specific requirements of Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME Code would result in the need for the licensee to maintain an unnecessarily high vessel temperature during pressure testing which would have an adverse impact on personnel safety because of the corresponding higher temperatures which would exist inside containment as leakage