ADDRESSES: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters, 300 E Street, SW., Room 6H45, Washington, DC 20546.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Glen R. Asner, Office of External Relations, (202) 358–0903, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC 20546–0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This meeting will be open to the public up to the seating capacity of the room. Five seats will be reserved for members of the press. The agenda for the meeting is as follows:

—To assess the operational readiness of the International Space Station to support a new crew.
—To assess the Russian and American flight teams' preparedness to accomplish the Expedition Sixteen mission.
—To assess the health and flight readiness of the Expedition Sixteen crew.

Attendees will be requested to sign a register and to comply with NASA security requirements, including the presentation of a valid picture ID, before receiving an access badge. Foreign nationals attending this meeting will be required to provide the following information: Full name; gender; date/place of birth; citizenship; visa/green card information (number, type, expiration date); passport information (number, country, expiration date); employer/affiliation information (name of institution, address, country, phone); title/position of attendee. To expedite admittance, attendees should provide identifying information in advance by contacting Glen Asner via e-mail at *glen.asner@nasa.gov* or by telephone at (202) 358–0903 by September 21, 2007. It is imperative that the meeting be held on this date to accommodate the scheduling priorities of the key participants.

Dated: August 24, 2007.

P. Diane Rausch,

Advisory Committee Management Officer, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

[FR Doc. E7–17468 Filed 9–4–07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510–13–P

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Agenda; Sunshine Act Meeting

TIME AND DATE: 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, September 11, 2007.

PLACE: NTSB Conference Center, 429 L'Enfant Plaza SW., Washington, DC 20594.

STATUS: The two items are open to the public.

MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED: 1124C, Motorcycle Safety Recommendation Letters.

7833a, *Railroad Accident Report*—Derailment of Chicago Transit Authority Train Number 220 Between Clark/Lake and Grand/Milwaukee Stations, Chicago, Illinois, July 11, 2006.

NEWS MEDIA CONTACT: Telephone: (202) 314–6100.

Individuals requesting specific accommodations should contact Chris Bisett at (202) 314–6305 by Friday, September 7, 2007.

The public may view the meeting via alive or archived webcast by accessing a link under ''News & Events'' on the NTSB home page at *http://www.ntsb.gov*.

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: Vicky D'Onofrio, (202) 314–6410.

Dated: August 31, 2007.

Vicky D'Onofrio,

Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 07–4352 Filed 8–31–07; 12:52 pm]

BILLING CODE 7533–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–237 and 50–249]

Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR–19 and Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR–25; Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR–19 and Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR–25 issued to Exelon Generation Company, LLC, (the licensee) for operation of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (DNPS), located in Grundy County, Illinois.

The proposed amendment would revise the values of the safety limit minimum critical power ratio (SLMCPR) in Technical Specification Section 2.1.1, ''Reactor Core SLs.'' The amendment request is being re-noticed because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff determined during the review of the licensee's request that the change affected the licenses for both units at the DNPS. This notice supersedes the notice that appeared on July 31, 2007 (72 FR 41783).

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The probability of an evaluated accident is derived from the probabilities of the individual precursors to that accident. The consequences of an evaluated accident are determined by the operability of plant systems designed to mitigate those consequences. Limits have been established consistent with NRC approved methods to ensure that fuel performance during normal, transient, and accident conditions is acceptable. The proposed change conservatively establishes the SLMCPR for DNPS Unit 2, Cycle 21 such that the fuel is protected during normal operation and during plant transients or anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs).

Changing the SLMCPR does not increase the probability of an evaluated accident. The change does not require any physical plant modifications, physically affect any plant components, or entail changes in plant operation. Therefore, no individual precursors of an accident are affected.

The proposed change revises the SLMCPR to protect the fuel during normal operation as well as during plant transients or AOOs. Operational limits will be established based on the proposed SLMCPR to ensure that the SLMCPR is not violated. This will ensure that the fuel design safety criterion (i.e., that at least 99.9% of the fuel rods do not experience transition boiling during normal operation and AOOs) is met. Since the proposed change does not affect operability of plant systems designed to mitigate any consequences of accidents, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not expected to increase.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the