

15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory factors, the Court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the government is entitled to "broad discretion to settle with the defendant within the reaches of the public interest." *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); *United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc.*, 534 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir. 1976) ("It is axiomatic that the Attorney General must retain considerable discretion in controlling government litigation and in determining what is in the public interest."); *United States v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc.*, 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining that the "court's inquiry is limited" in Tunney Act settlements); *United States v. InBev N.V./S.A.*, No. 08-1965 (JR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that a court's review of a consent judgment is limited and only inquires "into whether the government's determination that the proposed remedies will cure the antitrust violations alleged in the complaint was reasonable, and whether the mechanism to enforce the final judgment are clear and manageable").

Under the APPA, a court considers, among other things, the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations in the government's complaint, whether the proposed Final Judgment is sufficiently clear, whether its enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and whether it may positively harm third parties. *See Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1458–62. With respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by the proposed Final Judgment, a court may not "make de novo determination of facts and issues." *United States v. W. Elec. Co.*, 993 F.2d 1572, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting *United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc.*, No. 73 CV 681-W-1, 1977 WL 4352, at *9 (W.D. Mo. May 17, 1977)); *see also Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1460–62; *United States v. Alcoa, Inc.*, 152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); *United States v. Enova Corp.*, 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2000); *InBev*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3. Instead, "[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General." *W. Elec. Co.*, 993 F.2d at 1577 (quotation marks omitted).

"The court should bear in mind the flexibility of the public interest inquiry: the court's function is not to determine whether the resulting array of rights and liabilities is one that will best serve society, but only to confirm that the resulting settlement is within the reaches of the public interest." *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1460 (quotation marks omitted); *see also United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG*, No. 19-2232 (TJK), 2020 WL 1873555, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2020). More demanding requirements would "have enormous practical consequences for the government's ability to negotiate future settlements," contrary to congressional intent. *Id.* at 1456. "The Tunney Act was not intended to create a disincentive to the use of the consent decree." *Id.*; *see also United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc.*, No. 73 CV 681-W-1, 1977 WL 4352, at *9 (W.D. Mo. May 17, 1977) ("It was the intention of Congress in enacting [the] APPA to preserve

consent decrees as a viable enforcement option in antitrust cases.").

The United States' predictions about the efficacy of the remedy are to be afforded deference by the Court. *See, e.g., Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1461 (recognizing courts should give "due respect to the Justice Department's . . . view of the nature of its case"); *United States v. Iron Mountain, Inc.*, 217 F. Supp. 3d 146, 152–53 (D.D.C. 2016) ("In evaluating objections to settlement agreements under the Tunney Act, a court must be mindful that [t]he government need not prove that the settlements will perfectly remedy the alleged antitrust harms;[] it need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.") (internal citations omitted); *United States v. Republic Servs., Inc.*, 723 F. Supp. 2d 157, 160 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting "the deferential review to which the government's proposed remedy is accorded"); *United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.*, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) ("A district court must accord due respect to the government's prediction as to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market structure, and its view of the nature of the case"); *see also Mid-Am. Dairymen*, 1977 WL 4352, at *9 ("The APPA codifies the case law which established that the Department of Justice has a range of discretion in deciding the terms upon which an antitrust case will be settled"). The ultimate question is whether "the remedies [obtained by the Final Judgment are] so inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the 'reaches of the public interest.'" *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1461 (quoting *W. Elec. Co.*, 900 F.2d at 309).

Moreover, the Court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has alleged in its complaint, and does not authorize the Court to "construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree against that case." *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1459; *see also U.S. Airways*, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (noting that the court must simply determine whether there is a factual foundation for the government's decisions such that its conclusions regarding the proposed settlements are reasonable); *InBev*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 ("[T]he 'public interest' is not to be measured by comparing the violations alleged in the complaint against those the court believes could have, or even should have, been alleged"). Because the "court's authority to review the decree depends entirely on the government's exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place," it follows that "the court is only authorized to review the decree itself," and not to "effectively redraft the complaint" to inquire into other matters that the United States did not pursue. *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1459–60.

In its 2004 amendments to the APPA, Congress made clear its intent to preserve the practical benefits of using consent judgments proposed by the United States in antitrust enforcement, Pub. L. 108-237 § 221, and added the unambiguous instruction that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed

to require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to intervene." 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2); *see also U.S. Airways*, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (indicating that a court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing or to permit intervenors as part of its review under the Tunney Act). This language explicitly wrote into the statute what Congress intended when it first enacted the Tunney Act in 1974. As Senator Tunney explained: "[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the consent decree process." 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). "A court can make its public interest determination based on the competitive impact statement and response to public comments alone." *U.S. Airways*, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (citing *Enova Corp.*, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 17).

VIII. DETERMINATIVE DOCUMENTS

There are no determinative materials or documents within the meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in formulating the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: October 26, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Notice of Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

On October 23, 2020, the Department of Justice lodged a proposed Consent Decree with the United States District Court for the District of Montana in the lawsuit entitled *United States v. Atlantic Richfield Company*, Civil Action No. CV89-039-BU-SEH.

The proposed Consent Decree would partially resolve claims the United States and State of Montana have brought pursuant to Section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a), against the Atlantic Richfield Company related to the Anaconda Smelter National Priorities List Site.

The Consent Decree requires Atlantic Richfield to construct enhanced

remedial elements to address stormwater loading of contaminated sediments to surface water. Atlantic Richfield will remediate two smelter slag piles that have been left at the Site and will assure future operation and maintenance of the Old Works Golf Course in Anaconda, Montana, which was constructed on smelter wastes. In addition, the Consent Decree provides a path to waivers of surface water standards after Atlantic Richfield implements the technically practicable remedy elements outlined in the Consent Decree and its Statement of Work. The estimated cost of the work required under the Consent Decree is \$23.7 million. The Consent Decree also requires Atlantic Richfield to provide financial assurances for future cleanup actions. The Consent Decree provides Defendants and certain related persons covenants not to sue under Sections 106, 107(a), and 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9606, 9607(a), and 9613(f); Sections 3004(u) and (v), 3008, and 7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6924(u) and (v), 6928, and 6973; and Sections 309(b), 311, and 504 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1319(b), 1321, and 1364.

The publication of this notice opens a period for public comment on the Consent Decree. Comments should be addressed to the Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division, and should refer to *United States and State of Montana v. Atlantic Richfield Company*, D.J. Ref. No. 90–11–2–430. All comments must be submitted no later than thirty (30) days after the publication date of this notice. Comments may be submitted either by email or by mail:

<i>To submit comments:</i>	<i>Send them to:</i>
By email	<i>pubcomment-ees.enrd@usdoj.gov.</i>
By mail	Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DOJ—ENRD, P.O. Box 7611, Washington, DC 20044–7611.

Under section 7003(d) of RCRA, a commenter may request an opportunity for a public meeting in the affected area.

During the public comment period, the Consent Decree may be examined and downloaded at this Justice Department website: <https://www.justice.gov/enrd/consent-decrees>. We will provide a paper copy of the Consent Decree upon written request and payment of reproduction costs. Please mail your request and payment to: Consent Decree Library, U.S. DOJ—ENRD, P.O. Box 7611, Washington, DC 20044–7611.

Please enclose a check or money order for \$815.50 (25 cents per page reproduction cost) payable to the United States Treasury. For a paper copy of the Consent Decree without the appendices, the cost is \$23.00.

Jeffrey Sands,

Assistant Section Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division.

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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs

Construction Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements; Proposed Renewal of Information Collection Requirements; Comment Request

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Department of Labor (DOL), as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent burden, conducts a pre-clearance consultation program to provide the general public and federal agencies with an opportunity to comment on proposed and/or continuing collections of information in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA). The program helps to ensure that requested data can be provided in the desired format, reporting burden (time and financial resources) is minimized, collection instruments are clearly understood, and the impact of collection requirements on respondents can be properly assessed. Currently, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) is soliciting comments concerning its proposal to renew the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval of the information collection that covers OFCCP's construction recordkeeping and reporting requirements. The current OMB approval for this collection expires on April 30, 2021. A copy of the proposed information collection request can be obtained by contacting the office listed below in the **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT** section of this Notice or by accessing it at www.regulations.gov.

DATES: Written comments must be submitted to the office listed in the addresses section below on or before December 29, 2020.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Control Number 1250–0001, by any of the following methods:

Electronic comments: The federal eRulemaking portal at www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions found on that website for submitting comments.

Mail, Hand Delivery, Courier:

Addressed to Tina Williams, Director, Division of Policy and Program Development, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, Room C–3325, Washington, DC 20210.

Instructions: Please submit one copy of your comments by only one method. All submissions received must include the agency name and OMB Control Number identified above for this information collection. Commenters are strongly encouraged to submit their comments electronically via the www.regulations.gov website or to mail their comments early to ensure that they are timely received. Comments, including any personal information provided, become a matter of public record and will be posted to the www.regulations.gov website. They will also be summarized and/or included in the request for OMB approval of the information collection request.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tina Williams, Director, Division of Policy and Program Development, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Room C–3325, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20210. Telephone: (202) 693–0104 (voice) or (202) 693–1337 (TTY) (these are not toll-free numbers). Copies of this notice may be obtained in alternative formats (large print, braille, audio recording) upon request by calling the numbers listed above.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. **Background:** OFCCP administers and enforces three equal employment opportunity laws listed below.

- Executive Order 11246, as amended (E.O. 11246)
- Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (Section 503)
- Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, as amended (VEVRAA)

These authorities prohibit employment discrimination by covered federal contractors and subcontractors and require that they take affirmative action to provide equal employment opportunities regardless of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability, or status as a protected veteran. Additionally, federal contractors and subcontractors are prohibited from discriminating against applicants and employees for asking about, discussing,