

this meeting will be closed to the public.

Due to critical mission requirements and the limited timeframe to accomplish this review, there is insufficient time to provide timely notice required by section 10(c)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and Subsection 101–6.1015(b) of the GSA Final Rule on Federal Advisory Committee Management, 41 CFR Part 101–6, which further requires publication at least 15 calendar days prior to this meeting.

Dated: February 16, 2001.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 01–4483 Filed 2–22–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5001–10–M

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

Defense Science Board

ACTION: Notice of Advisory Committee meetings.

SUMMARY: The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Chemical Warfare Defense will meet in closed session on April 10, 2001, and April 24, 2001, at SAIC, 4001 N. Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201. The Task Force will assess the possibility of controlling the risk and consequences of a chemical warfare (CW) attack to acceptable national security levels within the next five years.

The mission of the Defense Science Board is to advise the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics on scientific and technical matters as they affect the perceived needs of the Department of Defense. At these meetings, the Defense Science Board Task Force will assess current national security and military objectives with respect to CW attacks; CW threats that significantly challenge these objectives today and in the future; the basis elements (R&D, materiel, acquisition, personnel, training, leadership) required to control risk and consequences to acceptable levels, including counter-proliferation; intelligence, warning, disruption; tactical detection and protection (active and passive); consequence management; attribution and deterrence; and policy. The Task Force will also assess the testing and evaluation necessary to demonstrate and maintain the required capability and any significant impediments to accomplishing this goal.

In accordance with section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Public Law 92–463, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. II), it has been determined that these Defense Science Board meetings, concern matters listed in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(1), and that accordingly these meetings will be closed to the public.

Dated: February 16, 2001.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 01–4484 Filed 2–22–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5001–10–M

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

Defense Science Board

ACTION: Notice of Advisory Committee meetings.

SUMMARY: The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Intelligence Needs for Homeland Defense—Follow-On Initiative will meet in closed session on February 27–28, 2001; March 27–28, 2001; and April 24–25, 2001, at Strategic Analysis, Inc., 3601 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22201. This Task Force will explore the intelligence ramifications posed by a changing spectrum of threat regimes, including biological, chemical, information, nuclear, and radiological weapons.

The mission of the Defense Science Board is to advise the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics on scientific and technical matters as they affect the perceived needs of the Department of Defense. At these meetings, the Defense Science Board Task Force will: consider the broad spectrum of intelligence issues from early threat detection to deterrence, through response—including attribution; evaluate the collection and analysis of target-related information and weapon unique information; examine the role of HUMINT against these missions as well as the technology that the HUMINT collectors need to be equipped with; consider strategic indications and warning and tactical warning dissemination and how the two need to be merged; analyze methodology to correlate large data flows spatially temporally and functionally (Low SNR); and assess the robustness of today's intelligence apparatus for coping with these challenges.

In accordance with section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act,

Public Law 92–463, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. II), it has been determined that these Defense Science Board meetings, concern matters listed in 5 U.S.C. 552(c)(1), and that accordingly these meetings will be closed to the public.

Due to critical mission requirements and scheduling conflicts, there is insufficient time to provide timely notice required by section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and Subsection 101–6.1015(b) of the GSA Final Rule on Federal Advisory Committee Management, 41 CFR Part 101–6, which further requires publication at least 15 calendar days prior to the meeting of the Task Force.

Dated: February 16, 2001.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

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BILLING CODE 5001–10–M

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

Defense Science Board; Meetings

ACTION: Notice of Advisory Committee meetings.

SUMMARY: The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts will meet in closed session on February 28, 2001, at SAIC, 4001 N. Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201. This Task Force will focus on identifying and characterizing what education and training are demanded by Joint Vision 2010/2020, and will address the development and demonstration time phasing over the next two decades for the combined triad of technology modernization, operational concepts, and training.

The mission of the Defense Science Board is to advise the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics on scientific and technical matters as they affect the perceived needs of the Department of Defense. At these meetings, the Defense Science Board Task Force will also identify those approaches and techniques that potential enemies might take that could prepare them to revolutionize their warfare capabilities, thereby achieving a training surprise against the U.S. or its allies. This review will include, but not be limited to, unique training/education developments which might be spawned by allies or an adversary, training techniques and methodologies which might be transferred from the U.S. or