

accidents and its elimination would not affect the probability of accidents previously evaluated.

In the 20 years since the TMI-2 accident and the consequential promulgation of post accident sampling requirements, operating experience has demonstrated that a PASS provides little actual benefit to post accident mitigation. Past experience has indicated that there exists in-plant instrumentation and methodologies available in lieu of a PASS for collecting and assimilating information needed to assess core damage following an accident. Furthermore, the implementation of Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG) emphasizes accident management strategies based on in-plant instruments. These strategies provide guidance to the plant staff for mitigation and recovery from a severe accident. Based on current severe accident management strategies and guidelines, it is determined that the PASS provides little benefit to the plant staff in coping with an accident.

The regulatory requirements for the PASS can be eliminated without degrading the plant emergency response. The emergency response, in this sense, refers to the methodologies used in ascertaining the condition of the reactor core, mitigating the consequences of an accident, assessing and projecting offsite releases of radioactivity, and establishing protective action recommendations to be communicated to offsite authorities. The elimination of the PASS will not prevent an accident management strategy that meets the initial intent of the post-TMI-2 accident guidance through the use of the SAMGs, the emergency plan (EP), the emergency operating procedures (EOP), and site survey monitoring that support modification of emergency plan protective action recommendations (PARs).

Therefore, the elimination of PASS requirements from Technical Specifications (TS) (and other elements of the licensing bases) does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

The elimination of PASS related requirements will not result in any failure mode not previously analyzed. The PASS was intended to allow for verification of the extent of reactor core damage and also to provide an input to offsite dose projection calculations. The

PASS is not considered an accident precursor, nor does its existence or elimination have any adverse impact on the pre-accident state of the reactor core or post accident confinement of radioisotopes within the containment building.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

The elimination of the PASS, in light of existing plant equipment, instrumentation, procedures, and programs that provide effective mitigation of and recovery from reactor accidents, results in a neutral impact to the margin of safety. Methodologies that are not reliant on PASS are designed to provide rapid assessment of current reactor core conditions and the direction of degradation while effectively responding to the event in order to mitigate the consequences of the accident. The use of a PASS is redundant and does not provide quick recognition of core events or rapid response to events in progress. The intent of the requirements established as a result of the TMI-2 accident can be adequately met without reliance on a PASS.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of December 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William D. Beckner,

Chief, Technical Specification Branch,
Division of Regulatory Improvement
Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.

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POSTAL SERVICE

United Postal Service Board of Governors; Sunshine Act Meeting

TIMES AND DATES: 8 a.m., Monday, January 7, 2002; 8:30 a.m., Tuesday, January 8, 2002.

PLACE: Washington, D.C., at U.S. Postal Service Headquarters, 475 L'Enfant Plaza, SW., in the Benjamin Franklin Room.

STATUS: January 7—8 a.m. (Closed); January 8—8:30 a.m. (Open).

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

Monday, January 7—8 a.m. (Closed)

1. Personnel Matters and Compensation Issues.
2. Management Compensation Strategy.
3. Financial Performance.
4. Strategic Planning.

Tuesday, January 8—8:30 a.m. (Open)

1. Minutes of the Previous Meetings, December 3-4, and December 13, 2001.
2. Remarks of the Postmaster General and CEO.
3. Consideration of Board Resolution on Capital Funding.
4. Annual Report on Government in the Sunshine Act Compliance.
5. Fiscal Year 2001 Annual Report.

Tuesday, January 8—8:30 a.m. (Open)
[continued]

6. Semipostal Stamps.
7. Quarterly Report on Financial Performance.
8. Quarterly Report on Service Performance.
9. Election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors.
10. Tentative Agenda for the February 4-5, 2002, meeting in Phoenix, Arizona.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: David G. Hunter, Secretary of the Board, U.S. Postal Service, 475 L'Enfant Plaza, SW., Washington, DC 20260-1000. Telephone (202) 268-4800.

David G. Hunter,
Secretary.

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. IC-25320; 812-12684]

Sensar Corporation; Notice of Application

December 19, 2001.

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission").

ACTION: Notice of an application for an order under section 6(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "Act").

SUMMARY OF APPLICATION: Sensar Corporation ("Applicant") requests an order exempting it from all provisions of the Act until the earlier of one year from the date that the requested order is