## **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

#### **Federal Aviation Administration**

## 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-29330; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-199-AD; Amendment 39-15338; AD 2008-02-08]

## RIN 2120-AA64

## Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model 717–200 Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717–200 airplanes. This AD requires electrical bonding of the fill valves for the right and left main fuel tanks, the fill valve and pipe assembly for the center wing fuel tank, and the defuel shutoff valve. This AD results from a fuel system review conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent improper bonding of the fill valves and defuel shutoff valve for the main fuel tanks and center wing tank, which, in combination with a lightning strike, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

**DATES:** This AD is effective February 26, 2008.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of February 26, 2008.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A (D800–0024).

## **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is the Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

## FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Samuel S. Lee, Aerospace Engineer,

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712–4137; telephone (562) 627–5262; fax (562) 627–5210.

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717–200 airplanes. That NPRM was published in the **Federal Register** on October 11, 2007 (72 FR 57894). That NPRM proposed to require electrical bonding of the fill valves for the right and left main fuel tanks, the fill valve and pipe assembly for the center wing fuel tank, and the defuel shutoff valve.

#### Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We considered the single comment received. AirTran Airways supports the NPRM.

#### Conclusion

We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comment received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

## **Costs of Compliance**

There are about 134 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. This AD affects about 104 airplanes of U.S. registry. The required actions take about 4 work hours per airplane, at an average labor rate of \$80 per work hour. Required parts cost about \$9 per airplane. Based on these figures, the estimated cost of the AD for U.S. operators is \$34,216, or \$329 per airplane.

## Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation

is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

## **Regulatory Findings**

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

- (1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,
- (2) Is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
- (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.

## List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

## **Adoption of the Amendment**

■ Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

## § 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

## 2008-02-08 McDonnell Douglas:

Amendment 39–15338. Docket No. FAA–2007–29330; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–199–AD.

## **Effective Date**

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective February 26, 2008.

## Affected ADs

(b) None.

## Applicability

(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas Model 717–200 airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 717–28–0012, Revision 1, dated June 7, 2006.

#### **Unsafe Condition**

(d) This AD results from a fuel system review conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent improper bonding of the fill valves and defuel shutoff valve for the main fuel tanks and center wing tank, which, in combination with a lightning strike, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

## Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

## **Electrical Bonding**

(f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the electrical bonding of the fill valves for the right and left main fuel tanks, the fill valve and pipe assembly for the center wing fuel tank, and the defuel shutoff valve, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 717–28–0012, Revision 1, dated June 7, 2006.

# Credit for Actions Done Using the Previous Service Information

(g) Actions accomplished before the effective date of this AD in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 717–28–0012, dated April 16, 2004, are considered acceptable for compliance with the corresponding actions specified in paragraph (f) of this AD.

## Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(h)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

### Material Incorporated by Reference

(i) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 717–28–0012, Revision 1, dated June 7, 2006, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A (D800–0024).

(3) You may review copies of the service information incorporated by reference at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal\_register/ code\_of\_federal\_regulations/ibr\_ locations.html.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 11, 2008.

## Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8–926 Filed 1–18–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

## **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

## **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-0185; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-246-AD; Amendment 39-15337; AD 2008-02-07]

## RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the CL-600-2B19 aircraft fuel system \* \* \*.

The assessment showed that if the fuel boost pump reducer coupling is anodized, insufficient electrical bonding between the boost pump canister and the pressure pick-up line could occur. Insufficient electrical bonding between the boost pump canister and the pressure pick-up line, if not corrected, could result in arcing and potential ignition source inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes and consequent fuel tank explosion. \* \* \*

We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

**DATES:** This AD becomes effective February 26, 2008.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of February 26, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

## FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Rocco Viselli, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe and Propulsion Branch, ANE– 171, FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516) 228–7331; fax (516) 794–5531.

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM was published in the **Federal Register** on November 13, 2007 (72 FR 63834). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the CL–600–2B19 aircraft fuel system against new fuel tank safety standards introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002–043. The identified non-compliances were assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525–001 to determine if mandatory corrective action is required.

The assessment showed that if the fuel boost pump reducer coupling is anodized, insufficient electrical bonding between the boost pump canister and the pressure pickup line could occur. Insufficient electrical bonding between the boost pump canister and the pressure pick-up line, if not corrected, could result in arcing and potential ignition source inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes and consequent fuel tank explosion. To correct the unsafe condition, this directive mandates a detailed visual inspection of the fuel boost pump for the presence of anodized reducer couplings. All anodized couplings found are to be replaced with couplings having ion vapor deposition (IVD) coating.

You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

## Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of the cost to the public.

### Conclusion

We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

# Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But