capabilities, which precludes DNDO or any other Federal Agency from providing a real-time and accurate accountability to decision-makers regarding available domestic R/N detection assets.

There is no assurance of confidentiality provided to respondents. There will be no collection of trade secret or business proprietary information. Furnishing this information is voluntary; however, failure to furnish the requested information may prevent a user from contributing radiological or nuclear detection information to RECE. This could cause a hindrance when attempting to allocate resources during a global nuclear detection architecture related threat incident.

The Office of Management and Budget is particularly interested in comments which:

- 1. Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility;
- 2. Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used;
- 3. Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and
- 4. Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submissions of responses.

## Analysis

*Agency:* Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DHS.

*Title:* Regional Equipment and Capabilities Exchange.

OMB Number: 1601-NEW.

Frequency: Annually.

Affected Public: State, Local, Tribal Governments.

Number of Respondents: 102.
Estimated Time per Respondent: 1
our.

Total Burden Hours: 102.

Dated: October 9, 2014.

### Margaret H. Graves,

Deputy Chief Information Officer. [FR Doc. 2014–25050 Filed 10–21–14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9110-9D-P

## DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

### Office of the Secretary

## United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel

**AGENCY:** Office of the Secretary, Department of Homeland Security. **ACTION:** Committee management: notice of committee establishment.

**SUMMARY:** In order to facilitate an effective review of the security provided by the U.S. Secret Service to the White House compound, the Department of Homeland Security (Department or DHS) is creating the U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel (USSSPMP or Panel). Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Department is taking immediate measures to establish this independent panel of experts to inquire into recent incidents at the White House compound and to provide to the Secretary of Homeland Security recommendations for potential new directors of the U.S. Secret Service and whether there should be a broader review of the U.S. Secret Service.

*Name of Committee:* U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peter Boogaard, Office of Public Affairs, (202) 282–8010, MediaInquiry@HQ.DHS.GOV.

### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### I. Background

DHS is establishing an independent panel to review the recent fence jumping incident at the White House on September 19, 2014 and related issues concerning security at the White House compound; to provide recommendations for potential new directors of the Secret Service; and to recommend whether there should be a broader review of the Secret Service. This time-sensitive and important review will entail discussion of classified information.

This Department has recognized in the past that some highly critical issues cannot be discussed in public without jeopardizing the security and confidentiality of sensitive homeland security information. For example, in 2006, the Department established the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) to aid in the communication and coordination between critical private sector entities and the Federal agencies charged with regulating them. See 71 FR 14930 (Mar. 24, 2006). Discussions between the members of that Council involve intelligence and law enforcement

information and remain non-public to avoid giving our nation's enemies information they could use to effectively attack a particular infrastructure.

Many of the issues to be reviewed by the Panel will require access to, and discussion of, non-public classified information and other non-public law enforcement sensitive information.

These matters include protective measures at the White House, sensitive law enforcement techniques and methods, and the management of these protective and law enforcement missions of the Secret Service.

### II. Identifying Solutions

The Department recognizes the importance of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). The FACA, when it applies, generally requires advisory committees to meet in open session and make publicly available associated written materials. It also requires a 15-day notice before any meeting may be closed to public attendance. These requirements, however, would prevent the Department from convening on short notice a panel to discuss the sensitive and classified information surrounding the review of protective measures at the White House compound and other U.S. Secret Service law enforcement missions in an appropriate setting. The FACA contains a number of exceptions to its general disclosure rules, but the applicability of those exceptions are not sufficient to address the proper handling of classified material and the protection of law enforcement sensitive information in this unique context. The information that will be discussed and reviewed by this panel will be deliberative in nature and will involve classified information that, if discussed in public, would result in the unauthorized disclosure of information that could reasonably be expected to result in threats or damage to national security. Furthermore, the information discussed will involve techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations. The release of this information would enable criminals and enemies to use that information to circumvent the law and could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of individuals.

Section 871 of the Homeland Security Act provides the Secretary of Homeland Security with the authority to establish advisory committees and exempt them from the FACA. 6 U.S.C. 451(a). This authority allows the Department to freely and completely review the security procedures, to discuss potential vulnerabilities, and to provide the Department with information and

recommendations that otherwise could not be discussed.

### III. Exercise of Section 871 Authority To Establish the U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel

The Department respects the principles of open government and has judiciously exercised the authority Congress provided in Section 871. Given that the use of this authority will allow the Department to fully and completely review the issues and make recommendations surrounding the U.S. Secret Service as described above, the Department is invoking that authority.

Collaboration among the panel members must involve many activities to include: planning, coordination, protective security implementation, operational activities related to protective service security measures, as well as leadership issues, vulnerabilities, protective measures, best practices, and lessons learned. An effective panel must be able to have ongoing, immediate, and multidirectional communication and coordination under highly exigent circumstances.

In furtherance of DHS' mission to provide protective services, the public interest requires the establishment of the Panel under the authority of 6 U.S.C. 451. The Panel will review recent incidents, provide recommendations on potential new directors, and recommend whether there should be a broader review of the Secret Service. The Panel will interact with federal officials and representatives from the security and law enforcement communities. The Panel has no authority to establish Federal policy or otherwise undertake inherently governmental functions.

Exemption from the FACA (Pub. L. 92-463): In recognition of the highlysensitive, and often confidential or classified nature of the subject matter involved in the activities of the USSSPMP, under the authority of section 871 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 451), the panel is hereby deemed exempt from the requirements of Public Law 92-463 (5 U.S.C. App.). The decision to exercise the exemption authority in section 871 will support the free flow of classified and law enforcement sensitive information concerning U.S. Secret Service protective measures and its operations as a law enforcement organization.

## IV. Membership and Structure

The specific membership of the USSSPMP will consist of individuals with expertise in: (a) National security, (b) protective security, (c) leading

complex organizations, and (d) other experts as the investigation dictates. The members are identified below at Appendix A.

*Membership Status:* Non-Federal members of the USSSPMP serve as special government employees.

Meetings: The USSSPMP may meet as a whole or in any combination of subgroups that is most conducive to the effective conduct of its activities including, without limitation, in groups encompassing discrete topics to address specific issues and concerns (e.g., a meeting of the members to discuss security specific issues, or a meeting of leaders of complex organizations). As independent bodies, meetings consisting solely of members of these subgroups shall not constitute meetings of the USSSPMP. In addition, the USSSPMP may establish informal working groups for the purpose of factfinding, issue development, or other preliminary non-deliberative activities. Such activities in support of the USSSPMP shall also be within the scope of the exemption noted above.

Duration of Committee: Six months, subject to extension pursuant to section 871(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 451(b)).

Dated: October 15, 2014.

Jeh Charles Johnson,

Secretary.

# Appendix A—Membership of the U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel

Thomas J. Perrelli Mark Filip Danielle C. Gray Joseph W. Hagin

[FR Doc. 2014–25052 Filed 10–21–14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9110-9B-P

## DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

### Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Docket ID FEMA-2014-0002]

## Changes in Flood Hazard Determinations

**AGENCY:** Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS. **ACTION:** Final Notice.

**SUMMARY:** New or modified Base (1-percent annual chance) Flood Elevations (BFEs), base flood depths, Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) boundaries or zone designations, and/or regulatory floodways (hereinafter referred to as flood hazard determinations) as shown on the indicated Letter of Map Revision

(LOMR) for each of the communities listed in the table below are finalized. Each LOMR revises the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs), and in some cases the Flood Insurance Study (FIS) reports, currently in effect for the listed communities. The flood hazard determinations modified by each LOMR will be used to calculate flood insurance premium rates for new buildings and their contents.

**DATES:** The effective date for each LOMR is indicated in the table below. **ADDRESSES:** Each LOMR is available for inspection at both the respective Community Map Repository address listed in the table below and online through the FEMA Map Service Center at *www.msc.fema.gov*.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Luis Rodriguez, Chief, Engineering Management Branch, Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, FEMA, 500 C Street SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646–4064, or (email) Luis.Rodriguez3@fema.dhs.gov; or visit the FEMA Map Information eXchange (FMIX) online at www.floodmaps.fema.gov/fhm/fmx\_main.html.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) makes the final flood hazard determinations as shown in the LOMRs for each community listed in the table below. Notice of these modified flood hazard determinations has been published in newspapers of local circulation and 90 days have elapsed since that publication. The Deputy Associate Administrator for Mitigation has resolved any appeals resulting from this notification.

The modified flood hazard determinations are made pursuant to section 206 of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. 4105, and are in accordance with the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 4001 *et seq.*, and with 44 CFR part 65.

For rating purposes, the currently effective community number is shown and must be used for all new policies and renewals.

The new or modified flood hazard information is the basis for the floodplain management measures that the community is required either to adopt or to show evidence of being already in effect in order to remain qualified for participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).

This new or modified flood hazard information, together with the floodplain management criteria required by 44 CFR 60.3, are the minimum that are required. They should not be