

CFR part 36 and the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92-574, the "Noise Control Act of 1972."

The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, under § 11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

The Learjet Model 45 series airplanes will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features: The proposed architecture and network configuration may be used for, or interfaced with, a diverse set of functions, including:

1. Flight-safety related control, communication, and navigation systems (aircraft control domain);
2. Operator business and administrative support (operator information domain); and
3. Passenger information and entertainment systems (passenger entertainment domain).

In addition, the operating systems (OS) for current aircraft systems are usually and historically proprietary. Therefore, they are not as susceptible to corruption from worms, viruses, and other malicious actions as more widely used commercial operating systems, such as Microsoft Windows NT, because access to the design details of these proprietary OS is limited to the system developer and aircraft integrator. Some systems installed on the Learjet Model 45 series airplanes will use operating systems that are widely used and commercially available from third party software suppliers. The security vulnerabilities of these operating systems may be more widely known than proprietary operating systems currently used by avionics manufacturers.

Discussion

The integrated network configurations in the Learjet Model 45 series airplanes may allow increased connectivity with external network sources and will have more interconnected networks and systems, such as passenger entertainment and information services than previous airplane models. This may allow the exploitation of network security vulnerabilities and increased risks potentially resulting in unsafe conditions for the airplanes and occupants. This potential exploitation of security vulnerabilities may result in intentional or unintentional destruction, disruption, degradation, or exploitation of data and systems critical to the safety and maintenance of the airplane. The existing regulations and guidance material did not anticipate these types of system architectures. Furthermore, 14

CFR regulations and current system safety assessment policy and techniques do not address potential security vulnerabilities which could be exploited by unauthorized access to airplane networks and servers. Therefore, these special conditions are being issued to ensure that the security (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of airplane systems is not compromised by unauthorized wired or wireless electronic connections between airplane systems and the passenger entertainment services.

For the reasons discussed above, these special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Learjet Model 45 series airplanes. Should Learjet apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model series of airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. Therefore, because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon publication in the **Federal Register**. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for Learjet Model 45 series airplanes.

Isolation or Security Protection of the Aircraft Control Domain and the Airline Information Services Domain From the Passenger Services Domain

1. The applicant must ensure that the design provides isolation from, or airplane electronic system security protection against, access by unauthorized sources internal to the airplane. The design must prevent inadvertent and malicious changes to, and all adverse impacts upon, airplane equipment, systems, networks, or other assets required for safe flight and operations.

2. The applicant must establish appropriate procedures to allow the operator to ensure that continued airworthiness of the aircraft is maintained, including all post-type-certification modifications that may have an impact on the approved electronic system security safeguards.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 22, 2013.

Stephen P. Boyd,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2013-25851 Filed 10-30-13; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0820; Notice No. 25-499-SC]

Special Conditions: Bombardier Inc., Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 Series Airplanes; Interactions of Systems and Structures

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Bombardier Inc. Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 series airplanes. These airplanes will have novel or unusual features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. These design features include systems that, directly or as a result of

failure or malfunction, affect structural performance. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for these design features. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is October 31, 2013. We must receive your comments by December 16, 2013.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA–2013–0820 using any of the following methods:

- *Federal eRegulations Portal:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov/> and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- *Mail:* Send comments to Docket Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590–0001.

- *Hand Delivery or Courier:* Take comments to Docket Operations in Room W12–140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays.

- *Fax:* Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202–493–2251.

Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov/>, including any personal information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can be found in the **Federal Register** published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), as well as at <http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov/>.

Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at <http://www.regulations.gov/> at any time. Follow the online instructions for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12–140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mark Freisthler, FAA, Airframe and Cabin Safety Branch, ANM–115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue

SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone 425–227–1119; facsimile 425–227–1232.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice of, and opportunity for prior public comment on, these special conditions is impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the design approval and thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has been subject to the public comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. The FAA therefore finds that good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon issuance.

Comments Invited

We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.

We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for comments. We may change these special conditions based on the comments we receive.

Background

On December 10, 2009, Bombardier Inc. applied for a type certificate for their new Models BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series airplanes. The Models BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series airplanes are swept-wing monoplanes with a pressurized cabin, and they share an identical supplier base and significant common design elements. The fuselage is aluminum alloy material, blended double-bubble design, sized for nominal 5-abreast seating. Each airplane's powerplant includes two under-wing Pratt and Whitney PW1524G ultra high-bypass, geared turbofan engines. Flight controls are fly-by-wire systems with two passive/uncoupled side sticks. Avionics include five landscape primary cockpit displays. The dimensions of the airplanes encompass a wingspan of 115 feet; a height of 37.75 feet; and a length of 114.75 feet for the Model BD–500–1A10 and 127 feet for the Model BD–500–1A11. Passenger capacity is designated as 110 for the Model BD–500–1A10 and 125 for the Model BD–500–1A11. Maximum takeoff weight is 131,000 pounds for the Model BD–500–1A10 and 144,000 pounds for the Model BD–500–1A11. Maximum takeoff thrust is 21,000 pounds for the Model BD–500–1A10 and 23,300 pounds for the Model BD–500–1A11. The range is

3,394 miles (5,463 kilometres) for both models of airplanes. The maximum operating altitude is 41,000 feet for both models of airplanes.

Type Certification Basis

Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17, Bombardier Inc. must show that the Model BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series airplanes meet the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25 as amended by Amendments 25–1 through 25–129 thereto.

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Models BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series airplanes because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model.

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series airplanes must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36, and the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92–574, the “Noise Control Act of 1972.”

The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance with § 11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

The Models BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series airplanes will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features: Systems that affect the airplane's structural performance, either directly or as a result of failure or malfunction. That is, the airplane's systems affect how it responds in maneuver and gust conditions, and thereby affect its structural capability. These systems may also affect the aeroelastic stability of the airplane. Such systems include flight control systems, autopilots, stability augmentation systems, load alleviation systems, and fuel management systems. These systems represent novel and unusual features when compared to the

technology envisioned in the current airworthiness standards.

Discussion

The flight control system of the Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 series airplanes will consist of a full authority fly-by-wire system with normal and direct modes of operation. Special conditions have been applied on past airplane programs, with similar systems, in order to require consideration of the effects of those systems on structures. The regulatory authorities and industry developed standardized criteria in the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) forum based on the criteria defined in Advisory Circular 25.672, dated November 11, 1983. The ARAC recommendations have been incorporated in European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specifications (CS) 25.302 and CS-25 Appendix K. FAA rulemaking on this subject is not complete, thus the need for special conditions.

These special conditions are similar to those previously applied to other airplane models and to EASA CS 25.302. Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) plans to apply the CS 25.302 version of the special conditions. The differences between FAA special conditions and the current CS 25.302, which the FAA regards as minor, are shown below.

(1) Both these special conditions and CS 25.302 specify the design load conditions to be considered. Paragraphs 2a(1) and 2b(2)(i) of these special conditions clarify that, in some cases, different load conditions are to be considered due to other special conditions or equivalent level of safety findings.

(2) Both these special conditions and CS 25.302 allow consideration of the probability of being in a dispatched configuration when assessing subsequent failures and potential "continuation of flight" loads (see paragraph 2d below). These special conditions, however, also allow using probability when assessing failures that induce loads at the "time of occurrence," whereas CS 25.302 does not. The FAA provision is relieving. The FAA chooses to preserve these minor differences and go forward with this version of the special conditions.

Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 series airplanes. Should Bombardier Inc. apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model

incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on two models of airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. Therefore, because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon publication in the **Federal Register**. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for Bombardier Inc. Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 series airplanes.

1. *Interaction of Systems and Structures. General.*

a. For airplanes equipped with systems that affect structural performance, either directly or as a result of a failure or malfunction, the influence of these systems and their failure conditions must be taken into account when showing compliance with the requirements of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25 subparts C and D.

b. The following criteria must be used for showing compliance with these special conditions for airplanes equipped with flight control systems, autopilots, stability augmentation systems, load alleviation systems, flutter control systems, fuel management systems, and other systems that either directly or as a result of failure or

malfunction affect structural performance. If these special conditions are used for other systems, it may be necessary to adapt the criteria to the specific system.

c. The criteria defined herein only address the direct structural consequences of the system responses and performances and cannot be considered in isolation but should be included in the overall safety evaluation of the airplane. These criteria may in some instances duplicate standards already established for this evaluation. These criteria are only applicable to structure whose failure could prevent continued safe flight and landing. Specific criteria that define acceptable limits on handling characteristics or stability requirements when operating in the system degraded or inoperative mode are not provided in these special conditions.

d. Depending upon the specific characteristics of the airplane, additional studies may be required that go beyond the criteria provided in these special conditions in order to demonstrate the capability of the airplanes to meet other realistic conditions such as alternative gust or maneuver descriptions for an airplane equipped with a load alleviation system.

e. The following definitions are applicable to these special conditions:

(1) Structural performance: Capability of the airplane to meet the structural requirements of 14 CFR part 25.

(2) Flight limitations: Limitations that can be applied to the airplane flight conditions following an in-flight occurrence and that are included in the flight manual (e.g., speed limitations and avoidance of severe weather conditions).

(3) Operational limitations: Limitations, including flight limitations, that can be applied to the airplane operating conditions before dispatch (e.g., fuel, payload and Master Minimum Equipment List limitations).

(4) Probabilistic terms: The probabilistic terms (probable, improbable, extremely improbable) used in these special conditions are the same as those used in § 25.1309.

(5) Failure condition: The term "failure condition" is the same as that used in § 25.1309. However, these special conditions apply only to system failure conditions that affect the structural performance of the airplane (e.g., system failure conditions that induce loads, change the response of the airplane to inputs such as gusts or pilot actions, or lower flutter margins).

2. *Effect on Systems and Structures.*
The following criteria will be used in determining the influence of a system

and its failure conditions on the airplane structure.

a. System fully operative. With the system fully operative, the following apply:

(1) Limit loads must be derived in all normal operating configurations of the system from all the limit conditions specified in subpart C (or defined by special conditions or equivalent level of safety in lieu of those specified in subpart C), taking into account any special behavior of such a system or associated functions or any effect on the structural performance of the airplane that may occur up to the limit loads. In particular, any significant nonlinearity (rate of displacement of control surface, thresholds, or any other system nonlinearities) must be accounted for in a realistic or conservative way when

deriving limit loads from limit conditions.

(2) The airplane must meet the strength requirements of part 25 (static strength, residual strength) using the specified factors to derive ultimate loads from the limit loads defined above. The effect of nonlinearities must be investigated beyond limit conditions to ensure the behavior of the system presents no anomaly compared to the behavior below limit conditions. However, conditions beyond limit conditions need not be considered when it can be shown that the airplane has design features that will not allow it to exceed those limit conditions.

(3) The airplane must meet the aeroelastic stability requirements of § 25.629.

b. System in the failure condition. For any system failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable, the following apply:

(1) At the time of occurrence. Starting from 1-g level flight conditions, a realistic scenario, including pilot corrective actions, must be established to determine the loads occurring at the time of failure and immediately after failure.

(i) For static strength substantiation, these loads, multiplied by an appropriate factor of safety that is related to the probability of occurrence of the failure, are ultimate loads to be considered for design. The factor of safety (FS) is defined in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Factor of safety at the time of occurrence.

(ii) For residual strength substantiation, the airplane must be able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in subparagraph 2b(1)(i). For pressurized cabins, these loads must be combined with the normal operating differential pressure.

(iii) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to the speeds defined in § 25.629(b)(2). For failure conditions that result in speeds beyond V_C/M_C , freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown to increased speeds, so that the margins intended by § 25.629(b)(2) are maintained.

(iv) Failures of the system that result in forced structural vibrations (e.g., oscillatory failures) must not produce

loads that could result in detrimental deformation of primary structure.

(2) For the continuation of the flight. For the airplane, in the system-failed state and considering any appropriate reconfiguration and flight limitations, the following apply:

(i) The loads derived from the following conditions (or defined by special conditions or equivalent level of safety in lieu of the following conditions) at speeds up to V_C/M_C , or the speed limitation prescribed for the remainder of the flight, must be determined:

(A) The limit symmetrical maneuvering conditions specified in § 25.331 and in § 25.345.

(B) The limit gust and turbulence conditions specified in § 25.341 and in § 25.345.

(C) The limit rolling conditions specified in § 25.349 and the limit unsymmetrical conditions specified in § 25.367 and § 25.427(b) and (c).

(D) The limit yaw maneuvering conditions specified in § 25.351.

(E) The limit ground loading conditions specified in §§ 25.473, 25.491, 25.493(d) and 25.503.

(ii) For static strength substantiation, each part of the structure must be able to withstand the loads in paragraph 2b(2)(i) of these special conditions multiplied by a factor of safety depending on the probability of being in this failure state. The factor of safety (FS) is defined in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Factor of safety for continuation of flight.

$Q_j = (T_j)(P_j)$ where:

T_j = Average time spent in failure condition j (in hours)

P_j = Probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per hour)

Note: If P_j is greater than 10^{-3} per flight hour then a 1.5 factor of safety must be applied to all limit load conditions specified in subpart C.

(iii) For residual strength substantiation, the airplane must be able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in paragraph 2b(2)(ii) of these special conditions. For pressurized cabins, these loads must be

combined with the normal operating differential pressure.

(iv) If the loads induced by the failure condition have a significant effect on fatigue or damage tolerance, then their effects must be taken into account.

(v) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to a speed determined from Figure 3. Flutter clearance speeds V' and V'' may be based on the speed limitation specified for the remainder of the flight using the margins defined by § 25.629(b).




Figure 3: Clearance speed

V' = Clearance speed as defined by § 25.629(b)(2).

V'' = Clearance speed as defined by § 25.629(b)(1).

$Q_j = (T_j)(P_j)$ where:

T_j = Average time spent in failure condition j (in hours)

P_j = Probability of occurrence of failure mode j (per hour)

Note: If P_j is greater than 10^{-3} per flight hour, then the flutter clearance speed must not be less than V'' .

(vi) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must also be shown up to V' in Figure 3 above, for any probable system failure condition combined with any damage required or selected for investigation by § 25.571(b).

(3) Consideration of certain failure conditions may be required by other

sections of 14 CFR part 25 regardless of calculated system reliability. Where analysis shows the probability of these failure conditions to be less than 10^{-9} , criteria other than those specified in this paragraph may be used for structural substantiation to show continued safe flight and landing.

c. Failure indications. For system failure detection and indication, the following apply:

(1) The system must be checked for failure conditions, not extremely improbable, that degrade the structural capability below the level required by part 25 or significantly reduce the

reliability of the remaining system. As far as reasonably practicable, the flight crew must be made aware of these failures before flight. Certain elements of the control system, such as mechanical and hydraulic components, may use special periodic inspections, and electronic components may use daily checks, in lieu of detection and indication systems to achieve the objective of this requirement. These certification maintenance requirements must be limited to components that are not readily detectable by normal detection and indication systems and where service history shows that inspections will provide an adequate level of safety.

(2) The existence of any failure condition, not extremely improbable, during flight that could significantly affect the structural capability of the airplane and for which the associated reduction in airworthiness can be minimized by suitable flight limitations, must be signaled to the flight crew. For example, failure conditions that result in a factor of safety between the airplane strength and the loads of subpart C below 1.25, or flutter margins below V'' , must be signaled to the crew during flight.

d. Dispatch with known failure conditions. If the airplane is to be dispatched in a known system failure condition that affects structural performance, or affects the reliability of the remaining system to maintain structural performance, then the provisions of these special conditions must be met, including the provisions of paragraph 2a for the dispatched condition, and paragraph 2b for subsequent failures. Expected operational limitations may be taken into account in establishing P_j as the probability of failure occurrence for determining the safety margin in Figure 1. Flight limitations and expected operational limitations may be taken into account in establishing Q_j as the combined probability of being in the dispatched failure condition and the subsequent failure condition for the safety margins in Figures 2 and 3. These limitations must be such that the probability of being in this combined failure state and then subsequently encountering limit load conditions is extremely improbable. No reduction in these safety margins is allowed if the subsequent system failure rate is greater than 10^{-3} per hour.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 12, 2013.

Jeffrey E. Duven,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2013-25448 Filed 10-30-13; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0518; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-021-AD; Amendment 39-17607; AD 2013-20-01]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Agusta S.p.A. (Type Certificate Currently Held by AgustaWestland S.p.A) (Agusta) Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta Model A109A, A109AII, and A109C helicopters with a certain third stage turbine wheel installed. This AD requires installing a placard on the instrument panel and revising the limitations section of the rotorcraft flight manual (RFM). This AD was prompted by several incidents of third stage engine turbine wheel failures, which were caused by excessive vibrations at certain engine speeds during steady-state operations. These actions are intended to alert pilots to avoid certain engine speeds during steady-state operations, prevent failure of the third stage engine turbine, engine power loss, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

DATES: This AD is effective December 5, 2013.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain document listed in this AD as of December 5, 2013.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact Agusta Westland, Customer Support & Services, Via Per Tornavento 15, 21019 Somma Lombardo (VA) Italy, ATTN: Giovanni Cecchelli; telephone 39 0331 711133; fax 39 0331 711180; or at <http://www.agustawestland.com/technical-bullettins>. You may review the referenced service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov> or in person at the Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the foreign authority's AD, any incorporated-by-reference service information, the economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations Office, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Chinh Vuong, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222-5110; email chinh.vuong@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

On June 20, 2013, at 78 FR 37162, the **Federal Register** published our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to Agusta Model A109A, A109AII, and A109C helicopters with a third stage turbine wheel, part number (P/N) 23065833, installed. The NPRM proposed to require installing a placard on the instrument panel adjacent to the engine and rotor RPM power turbine (N2) indicator and revising the Operating Limitations sections of the Model A109A, A109AII, and A109C RFMs to limit steady-state operations between speeds of 95% and 97%. The proposed requirements were intended to alert pilots to avoid certain engine speeds during steady-state operations, prevent failure of the third stage engine turbine, engine power loss, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

The NPRM was prompted by AD No. 2009-0037-E, dated February 19, 2009, issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union. EASA issued AD No. 2009-0037-E to correct an unsafe condition for Agusta Model A109A, A109AII, and A109C helicopters with a Rolls Royce Corporation (RRC) engine Model 250-C20B or 250-C20R/1 having a third stage turbine wheel P/N 23065833 installed. EASA advises that following several third stage turbine wheel failures, the engine type