

Authority No. 523 of December 22, 2021.

Stacy E. White,

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Professional and Cultural Exchanges, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

[FR Doc. 2022–18524 Filed 8–26–22; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 11838]

Notice of Determinations; Culturally Significant Objects Being Imported for Exhibition—Determinations: “Modigliani Up Close” Exhibition

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: I hereby determine that certain objects being imported from abroad pursuant to agreements with their foreign owners or custodians for temporary display in the exhibition “Modigliani Up Close” at The Barnes Foundation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, are of cultural significance, and, further, that their temporary exhibition or display within the United States as aforementioned is in the national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these determinations be published in the **Federal Register**.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chi D. Tran, Program Administrator, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202–632–6471; email: section2459@state.gov). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, L/PD, 2200 C Street NW (SA–5), Suite 5H03, Washington, DC 20522–0505.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The foregoing determinations were made pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), E.O. 12047 of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681, *et seq.*; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, *et seq.*), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236–3 of August 28, 2000, and Delegation of Authority No. 523 of December 22, 2021.

Stacy E. White,

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Professional and Cultural Exchanges, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

[FR Doc. 2022–18522 Filed 8–26–22; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 11839]

International Joint Commission Invites Public Comment on Lake Champlain-Richelieu River Flood Study Final Report

ACTION: Notice of public hearing on Lake Champlain-Richelieu River Flood Study Final Report.

SUMMARY: The International Joint Commission (IJC) announced today that it is inviting public comment on the final report of its International Lake Champlain-Richelieu River Study Board’s (LCRRSB) Flood Study Final Report. The study explores the causes, impacts, risks, and solutions for flooding in Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River. Comments will be accepted at public hearings, webinars, and by mail, email and on-line through September 30, 2022. The LCRRSB’s full report can be found on the IJC website at: www.ijc.org/lcrr.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christina Chiasson (Ottawa) (613) 293–1031 at christina.chiasson@ijc.org or Kevin Bunch (Washington, DC) (202) 632–2014 at kevin.bunch@ijc.org.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

September 7–8, 2022, Public Hearings on LCRRSB’s Flood Study Final Report

Date: September 7, 2022.

Time: 6:00 p.m.–8:00 p.m. EST.

Location: Royal Military College Saint-Jean, Auditorium Vanier, 15 Rue Jacques-Cartier Nord, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec.

Date: September 8, 2022.

Time: 6:00 p.m.–8:00 p.m. EST.

Location: Hotel Vermont, Juniper Room, 41 Cherry St. Burlington, Vermont.

The International Joint Commission will receive comments in person at the public hearings. Public input is essential to the Commission’s consideration of potential recommendations to the Governments of the United States and Canada.

For more information on the upcoming virtual webinars, visit www.ijc.org/lcrr.

The LCRRSB study findings and recommendations cover four key themes:

- Reduction in water levels via structural mitigation measures
- Effects on impeding flows during floods of existing and additional wetlands in the basin
- Enhancements to flood forecasting and flood response in the basin

- Floodplain management best practices and lessons learned in other watersheds

The LCRRSB was established by the IJC in 2016 to assist in responding to a reference by the governments of the United States and Canada under Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty. The reference was precipitated by major flooding in the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River basin in 2011. The basin forms in the United States between New York and Vermont, with much of Lake Champlain forming a border between the two states. The northern part of Lake Champlain crosses into Quebec, where it flows into the Richelieu River. The Richelieu River in turn joins with the St. Lawrence River near Montréal and continues flowing east to the Atlantic Ocean.

The governments requested the IJC to coordinate the full completion of Option B under the under the 2013 IJC Plan of Study. As part of this reference, the IJC was asked to evaluate the causes and impacts of the 2011 flooding, and to make recommendations to mitigate future flood risks in the basin.

IJC recommendations to the two federal governments under Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty are not binding and not to be considered decisions of the two governments.

The main study recommendations include:

1. That selective excavation of the riverbed near Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec combined with the construction of a submerged weir would reduce high water levels during floods and would have the added benefit of raising water levels on Lake Champlain during dry years. A moderate diversion of high flows through the Chambly Canal could also be considered for additional flood-reduction benefits.

2. The preservation of existing wetland areas, which can minimize water levels during floods while also stabilizing water levels during droughts in the basin.

3. The governments are encouraged to operationalize the improved modeling and forecasting tools and coherent risk assessment systems and support/maintain them after the Study. The agencies responsible for flood forecasting in the basin should continue collaboration and make available forecasting data so that forecasts on both sides of the border are of the highest possible quality and are accompanied by a concerted and consistent cross-border interpretation.

4. Improving floodplain mapping for the use of emergency managers and enhancing communication campaigns

around flood risk in the basin. The Board also recommended that jurisdictions in the basin review their floodplain management policies through the lens of making these areas more resilient for possible future floods.

The full study board report and recommendations can be found at www.ijc.org/lcrr.

The International Joint Commission was established under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to help the United States and Canada prevent and resolve disputes over the use of the waters the two countries share. The Commission's responsibilities include investigating and reporting on issues of concern when asked by the governments of the two countries. For more information, visit the IJC website at ijc.org.

Susan E. Daniel,

Secretary, U.S. Section, International Joint Commission, Department of State.

[FR Doc. 2022-18503 Filed 8-26-22; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 11842]

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Administrative Debarment Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Involving Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the Department of State has imposed administrative debarment under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) on Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke.

DATES: Debarment imposed as of August 29, 2022.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jae E. Shin, Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State (202) 632-2107.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 127.7(c)(2) of the ITAR authorizes the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs to debar any person who has been found pursuant to part 128 of the ITAR to have committed a violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) or when such violation is of such character as to provide a reasonable basis for the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls to believe that the violator cannot be relied upon to comply with the AECA or ITAR in the future. Such debarment prohibits the subject from participating directly or indirectly in the export of defense articles or defense services for which a

license or other approval is required by the ITAR.

Debarred persons are generally ineligible to participate in activity regulated under the ITAR (see, e.g., § 120.1(c) and (d), § 126.7, § 127.1(c), and § 127.11(a)). The Department of State will not consider applications for licenses or requests for approvals that involve any debarred person.

Between January 2016 and November 2019, Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke (“Respondents”) were employed by DarkMatter Group (DarkMatter), a privately held technology and cyber services company headquartered and organized in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that furnished cyber services to the UAE government. Prior to working at DarkMatter, a foreign corporation registered in the UAE, Respondents were employed by CyberPoint International LLC (CyberPoint) a U.S.-based company that furnished cyber services to the UAE government pursuant to ITAR licenses or other approvals, including technical assistance agreements. CyberPoint and DarkMatter were competitors, and in late 2015 and early 2016, the UAE government transitioned its contracts for cyber services from CyberPoint to DarkMatter. During this time period, DarkMatter hired certain U.S.-person former managers of CyberPoint, including Respondents.

Respondents possessed computer network exploitation (CNE) expertise that included the development, maintenance, deployment, and operation of software and hardware designed to obtain unauthorized access to electronic devices and accounts. Respondents used their CNE expertise to provide and support CNE services to persons and entities in the UAE and the UAE government on behalf of DarkMatter.

Among their other activities, Respondents created certain zero-click computer hacking and intelligence gathering systems that Respondents specially designed, developed, maintained, and operated to allow its users access to tens of millions of devices for the UAE government’s intelligence purposes. The services Respondents performed in connection with the relevant systems constituted furnishing defense services under U.S. Munitions List (USML) Category XI(d) because: (a) the relevant systems were electronic systems, equipment, or software that were specially designed for intelligence purposes that collect, survey, monitor, exploit, analyze, or produce information from the electromagnetic spectrum as described

in USML Category XI(b); and (b) Respondents assisted foreign persons in the use, design, development, engineering, production, modification, testing, maintenance, processing, or operation of the relevant systems. Respondents did not have a license or other approval to furnish such ITAR-controlled defense services.

As a result of these violations, on July 7, 2022 (Adams and Baier) and August 5, 2022 (Gericke), the Department of State and Respondents entered into Consent Agreements that administratively debarred Respondents until July 7, 2025 and August 5, 2025, respectively, and pursuant to order of the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs they are administratively debarred. Reinstatement after July 7, 2025 and August 5, 2025 is not automatic but contingent on full compliance with the terms of the July 7, 2022 and August 5, 2022, Consent Agreements and evidence that the underlying problems that gave rise to the violations have been corrected. At the end of the debarment period, Respondents may apply for reinstatement. Until licensing privileges are reinstated, Respondents will remain administratively debarred.

This notice is provided to make the public aware that the persons listed above are prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in any brokering activities and in any export from or temporary import into the United States of defense articles, related technical data, or defense services in all situations covered by the ITAR.

Exceptions may be made to this denial policy on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. However, such an exception would be granted only after a full review of all circumstances, paying particular attention to the following factors: whether an exception is warranted by overriding U.S. foreign policy or national security interests; whether an exception would further law enforcement concerns that are consistent with foreign policy or national security interests of the United States; or whether other compelling circumstances exist that are consistent with the foreign policy or national security interests of the United States, and law enforcement concerns.

This notice involves a foreign affairs function of the United States encompassed within the meaning of the military and foreign affairs exclusion of the Administrative Procedure Act. Because the exercise of this foreign affairs function is highly discretionary,