

Thursday, September 20, 2012

7:15 a.m.–4:30 p.m. Open—Review of the MRSEC

5 p.m.–6:45 p.m. Closed—Executive Session

Friday, September 21, 2012

7:15 a.m.–9:50 a.m. Closed—Executive Session

9:50 a.m.–4:30 p.m. Closed—Executive Session, Draft and Review Report

Reason for Late Notice: Due to scheduling conflicts and the necessity to proceed with the review.

Reason for Closing: The work being reviewed may include information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including technical information; financial data, such as salaries and personal information concerning individuals associated with the MRSEC. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552 b(c), (4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: September 6, 2012.

Susanne Bolton,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. 2012–22375 Filed 9–10–12; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD**Sunshine Act Meeting**

TIME AND DATE: 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, September 25, 2012.

PLACE: NTSB Conference Center, 429 L'Enfant Plaza SW., Washington, DC 20594.

STATUS: The ONE item is open to the public.

MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED:

8434 *Marine Accident Report—Collision of Tankship Elka Apollon With Containership MSC Nederland, Houston Ship Channel, Upper Galveston Bay, Texas, October 29, 2011.*

NEWS MEDIA CONTACT: Telephone: (202) 314–6100.

The press and public may enter the NTSB Conference Center one hour prior to the meeting for set up and seating.

Individuals requesting specific accommodations should contact Rochelle Hall at (202) 314–6305 by Friday, September 21, 2012.

The public may view the meeting via a live or archived webcast by accessing a link under “News & Events” on the NTSB home page at www.ntsbt.gov.

Schedule updates including weather-related cancellations are also available at www.ntsbt.gov.

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: Candi Bing, (202) 314–6403 or by email at bingc@ntsb.gov.

FOR MEDIA INFORMATION CONTACT: Terry Williams (202) 314–6126 or by email at williat@ntsb.gov.

Dated: September 7, 2012.

Candi R. Bing,

Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 2012–22424 Filed 9–7–12; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 7533–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC–2012–0208]

Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving Proposed No Significant Hazards Considerations and Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: License amendment request; opportunity to comment, request a hearing and petition for leave to intervene, order.

DATES: Comments must be filed by October 11, 2012. A request for a hearing must be filed by November 13, 2012. Any potential party as defined in Section 2.4 of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), who believes access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI) is necessary to respond to this notice must request document access by September 21, 2012.

ADDRESSES: You may access information and comment submissions related to this document, which the NRC possesses and are publicly available, by searching on <http://www.regulations.gov> under Docket ID NRC–2012–0208. You may submit comments by any of the following methods:

- *Federal Rulemaking Web site:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID NRC–2012–0208. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301–492–3668; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.

- *Mail comments to:* Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration, Mail Stop: TWB–05–B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.

- *Fax comments to:* RADB at 301–492–3446.

For additional direction on accessing information and submitting comments, see “Accessing Information and Submitting Comments” in the **SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION** section of this document.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments****A. Accessing Information**

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2012–0208 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may access information related to this document, which the NRC possesses and is publicly available, by the following methods:

- *Federal Rulemaking Web Site:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID NRC–2012–0208.

- *NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):* You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC Library at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To begin the search, select “ADAMS Public Documents” and then select “Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.” For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced in this notice (if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced.

- *NRC's PDR:* You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

B. Submitting Comments

Please include Docket ID NRC–2012–0208 in the subject line of your comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make your comment submission available to the public in this docket.

The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at <http://www.regulations.gov> as well as enter the comment submissions into ADAMS, and the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information.

If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for

submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.

II. Background

Pursuant to Section 189a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this notice. The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license or combined license, as applicable, upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.

This notice includes notices of amendments containing SUNSI.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for a Hearing

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The

Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment period or the notice period, it will publish in the **Federal Register** a notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, then any hearing will take place after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license or combined license. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR part 2. Interested person(s) should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852. The NRC's regulations are accessible electronically from the NRC Library on the NRC's Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/>. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed within 60 days, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following general requirements: (1) The

name, address, and telephone number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must also set forth the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.

Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the requestor/petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The requestor/petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the requestor/petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing.

If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment

request involves a significant hazards consideration, then any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

All documents filed in the NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139; August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in accordance with the procedures described below.

To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.

Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is available on the NRC's public Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html>. System requirements for accessing the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's "Guidance for Electronic Submission," which is available on the agency's public Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html>. Participants may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer assistance in using unlisted software.

If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on the NRC's public Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html>.

Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC guidance available on the NRC's public Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html>. A filing is considered complete at the time the documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document via the E-Filing system.

A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System Help Desk through the "Contact Us" link located on the NRC's Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html>, by email at MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-7640. The NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.

Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not submitting documents electronically must file an

exemption request, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from use of E-Filing no longer exists.

Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at <http://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/>, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in their submission.

Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60 days from the date of publication of this notice. Requests for hearing, petitions for leave to intervene, and motions for leave to file new or amended contentions that are filed after the 60-day deadline will not be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer that the filing demonstrates good cause by satisfying the following three factors in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1): (i) The information upon which the filing is based was not previously available; (ii) the information upon which the filing is based is materially different from

information previously available; and (iii) the filing has been submitted in a timely fashion based on the availability of the subsequent information.

For further details with respect to these amendment actions, see the applications for amendment which are available for public inspection at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852. Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are accessible electronically through ADAMS in the NRC Library at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the PDR's Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.

Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana

Date of amendment request: June 20, 2012. A publicly available version is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML12191A122.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The amendment would revise License Amendment No. 171 to the Facility Operating License for the River Bend Station (RBS), dated July 29, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111940200), which approved the RBS Cyber Security Plan and associated implementation milestone schedule. The Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule contained in the licensee's letter dated April 4, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11103A043), was utilized, as a portion of the basis for the NRC's safety evaluation report provided by Amendment No. 171. The proposed amendment does not change the Implementation Schedule date, but Entergy has proposed this amendment to implement the requirements of Implementation Schedule Milestone 6 in a slightly different manner than described in the approved Implementation Schedule.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to these established safety margins as result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Associate General Counsel—Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 70113.

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Energy Northwest, Docket No. 50-397, Columbia Generating Station, Benton County, Washington

Date of amendment request: January 31, 2012. A publicly available version is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML120400144.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The amendment would allow the licensee to expand the operating domain by the implementation of Average Power Range Monitor/Rod Block Monitor/Technical Specifications/Power Range Neutron Monitoring/Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis (ARTS/PRNM/MELLLA). The Neutron Monitoring System would be modified by replacing the analog Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) subsystem with the Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control (NUMAC) Power Range Neutron Monitoring (PRNM) System. The licensee would expand the operating domain to Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis (MELLLA) and make changes to certain allowable values (AVs) and limits and to the Technical Specifications (TSs). The changes to the TSs include the adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Change Traveler TSTF-493, "Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS [Limiting Safety System Setting] Functions," Option A surveillance notes. Furthermore, the amendment would allow a change in the licensing basis to support Anticipated Transient without Scram (ATWS) accident mitigation with one Standby Liquid Control (SLC) pump instead of two.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of NSHC, by classification of change, which is presented below. The proposed NSHC for PRNM system upgrade is presented first, followed by the proposed NSHC for the implementation of ARTS/MELLLA.

PRNM System Upgrade

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The probability (frequency of occurrence) of Design Basis Accidents occurring is not affected by the PRNM system, as the PRNM system does not interact with equipment whose failure could cause an accident. The

regulatory criteria established for plant equipment such as the APRM, OPRM [Oscillation Power Range Monitor], and RBM [Rod Block Monitor] systems will be maintained with the installation of the upgraded PRNM system. Scram setpoints in the PRNM system will be established so that all analytical limits are met.

The unavailability of the new system will be equal to or less than the existing system and, as a result, the scram reliability will be equal to or better than the existing system. No new challenges to safety-related equipment will result from the PRNM system modification.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change will replace the currently installed and NRC approved OPRM Option III long-term stability solution with an NRC approved Option III long-term stability solution digitally integrated into the PRNM equipment. The PRNM hardware incorporates the OPRM Option III detect and suppress solution reviewed and approved by the NRC in References 1, 2, 3, and 4 [References in Attachment 2 of the License Amendment Request] Licensing Topical Reports [(LTRs)], the same as the currently installed separate OPRM System. The OPRM meets the [General Design Criteria (GDCs)] 10, "Reactor Design," and 12, "Suppression of Reactor Power Oscillations," requirements by automatically detecting and suppressing design basis thermal hydraulic oscillations to protect specified fuel design limits.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Based on the above, the operation of the new PRNM system and replacement of the currently installed OPRM Option III stability solution with the Option III OPRM function integrated into the PRNM equipment will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The components of the PRNM system will be supplied to equivalent or better design and qualification criteria than is currently required for the plant. Equipment that could be affected by PRNM system has been evaluated. No new operating mode, safety-related equipment lineup, accident scenario, or system interaction mode was identified. Therefore, the upgraded PRNM system will not adversely affect plant equipment.

The new PRNM system uses digital equipment that has "control", processing points and software controlled digital processing compared to the existing PRNM system that uses mostly analog and discrete component processing (excluding the existing OPRM). Specific failures of hardware and potential software common cause failures are different from the existing system. The effects of potential software common cause failure are mitigated by specific hardware design and system

architecture as discussed in Section 6.0 of the NUMAC PRNM LTR reference [in the license amendment request]. Failure(s) of the system have the same overall effect as the present design. No new or different kind of accident is introduced. Therefore, the PRNM system will not adversely affect plant equipment.

The currently installed APRM System is replaced with a NUMAC PRNM system that performs the existing power range monitoring functions and adds an OPRM to react automatically to potential reactor thermal-hydraulic instabilities.

Based on the above, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed TS changes associated with the NUMAC PRNM system retrofit implement the constraints of the NUMAC PRNM system design and related stability analyses. The NUMAC PRNM system change does not impact reactor operating parameters or the functional requirements of the PRNM system. The replacement equipment continues to provide information, enforce control rod blocks, and initiate reactor scrams under appropriate specified conditions. The proposed change does not reduce safety margins. The replacement PRNM equipment has improved channel trip accuracy compared to the current analog system, and meets or exceeds system requirements previously assumed in setpoint analysis. Thus, the ability of the new equipment to enforce compliance with margins of safety equals or exceeds the ability of the equipment which it replaces.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

ARTS/MELLLA Implementation

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change eliminates the APRM flow-biased STP [Simulated Thermal Power] shutdown requirement and substitutes power and flow dependent adjustments to the [Maximum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)] and Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) thermal limits. Thermal limits will be determined using NRC approved analytical methods. The proposed change will have no effect upon any accident initiating mechanism. The power and flow dependent adjustments will ensure that the MCPR SL [Safety Limit] will not be violated as a result of any [anticipated operational occurrence (AOO)], and that the fuel thermal and mechanical design bases will be maintained.

The proposed change also expands the power and flow operating domain by relaxing the restrictions imposed by the formulation of the APRM flow-biased STP AV and by the replacement of the current flow-biased RBM with a new power-dependent RBM. As discussed in the Technical Evaluation

Section 1.0 [in the license amendment request], and Attachment 1 [to the license amendment request], operation in the MELLLA expanded operating domain will not increase the probability or consequences of previously analyzed accidents. The APRM and RBM are not involved in the initiation of any accident, and the APRM flow-biased STP function is not credited in any CGS [Columbia Generating Station] safety analyses. The proposed change will not introduce any initial conditions that would result in NRC approved criteria being exceeded and the APRM and RBM will remain capable of performing their design functions.

The SLC system is provided to shutdown the reactor without reliance on control rod movement, to mitigate anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) events and provide suppression pool pH control following a LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident]. As such, SLC is not considered an initiator of an ATWS event, LOCA or any other analyzed accident. The revised SLC pump flow rate and increased Boron-10 enrichment continue to meet the shutdown requirement of SLC. The changes do not reduce the ability of the SLC system to respond to or mitigate an ATWS event or LOCA. Nor do these changes increase the likelihood of a system malfunction that could increase the consequences of an accident.

Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change eliminates the APRM flow-biased STP shutdown requirement and substitutes power and flow dependent adjustments to the MCPR and LHGR thermal limits. Because the thermal limits will continue to be met, no analyzed transient event will escalate into a new or different type of accident due to the initial starting conditions permitted by the adjusted thermal limits.

The proposed change also expands the power and flow operating domain by relaxing the restrictions imposed by the formulation of the APRM flow-biased STP AV and the replacement of the current flow-biased RBM with a new power-dependent RBM. Changing the formulation for the flow-biased STP AV and changing from a flow-biased RBM to a power-dependent RBM does not change their respective functions and manner of operation. The change does not introduce a sequence of events or introduce a new failure mode that would create a new or different type of accident. While not credited for MCPR [safety limit (SL)] protection, the APRM flow-biased STP AV and associated scram trip setpoint will continue to provide a redundant trip for the credited trip functions (such as APRM Fixed Neutron Flux—High or Reactor Pressure—High). The power-dependent RBM will prevent rod withdrawal when the power-dependent RBM rod block setpoint is reached, thus protecting

MCPR SL. No new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators are being introduced by the proposed change. In addition, operating within the expanded power flow map will not require any systems, structures or components to function differently than previously evaluated and will not create initial conditions that would result in a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change to the SLC pump flow rate credited in the ATWS analysis, in conjunction with the increased enrichment of Boron-10 in the sodium pentaborate solution, is consistent with the functional requirements of the ATWS rule (10 CFR 50.62). These proposed changes do not involve the installation of any new or different type of equipment, do not introduce any new modes of plant operation, and do not change any methods governing normal plant operation.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed change eliminates the APRM flow-biased STP setdown requirement and substitutes power and flow dependent adjustments to the MCPR and LHGR thermal limits. Replacement of the APRM setdown requirement with power and flow dependent adjustments to the MCPR and LHGR thermal limits will continue to ensure that margins to the fuel cladding SL are preserved during operation at other than rated conditions. Thermal limits will be determined using NRC approved analytical methods. The power and flow dependent adjustments will ensure that the MCPR SL will not be violated as a result of any AOO, and that the fuel thermal and mechanical design bases will be maintained.

The proposed change also expands the power and flow operating domain by relaxing the restrictions imposed by the formulation of the APRM flow-biased STP AV and the replacement of the current flow-biased RBM with a new power-dependent RBM. The APRM flow-biased STP AV and associated scram trip setpoint will continue to initiate a scram, providing a redundant trip that is not credited for protection of MCPR SL. The RBM will continue to prevent rod withdrawal when the power-dependent RBM rod block setpoint is reached. The MCPR and LHGR thermal limits will be developed to ensure that fuel thermal mechanical design bases remain within the licensing limits during a control rod withdrawal error event and to ensure that the MCPR SL will not be violated as a result of a control rod withdrawal error event. Operation in the expanded operating domain will not alter the manner in which SLs, Limiting Safety System Setpoints (LSSSs), or limiting conditions for operation are determined. AOOs and postulated accidents within the expanded operating domain will continue to be evaluated using NRC approved methods. The 10 CFR 50.46 acceptance criteria for the performance of the ECCS [emergency core cooling system] following postulated LOCAs will continue to be met.

The proposed change to the SLC flow rate, in conjunction with the increased Boron-10 enrichment in the sodium pentaborate solution, credited in the ATWS analysis continues to meet accident analyses limits. The proposed change is consistent with the functional requirements of the ATWS rule (10 CFR 50.62) and the flow rate credited for LOCA suppression pool pH control. The ability of the SLC system to respond to and mitigate an ATWS event or LOCA is not affected.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: William A. Horin, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006–3817.

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247 and 50–286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Westchester County, New York

Date of amendment request: June 14, 2012. A publicly available version is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML12184A050.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The amendments would revise the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule as approved in license amendments issued on August 2, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11152A027).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to

mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. The proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to these established safety margins as result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. William C. Dennis, Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 Hamilton Avenue, White Plains, NY 10601.

NRC Branch Chief: George Wilson.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–255, Palisades Nuclear Plant, Van Buren County, Michigan

Date of amendment request: June 20, 2012. A publicly available version is available under ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12184A149, ML12177A363, and ML12177A365.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The NRC issued the Palisades Cyber Security Plan and associate Implementation Schedule on July 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111801243). The amendment would implement the requirements of Implementation Schedule Milestone 6 in a slightly different manner than described in the approved Implementation Schedule.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation,

limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to these established safety margins as result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. William Dennis, Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 400 Hamilton Ave., White Plains, NY 10601.

NRC Acting Branch Chief: Istvan Frankl.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-293, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth County, Massachusetts

Date of amendment request: June 22, 2012. A publicly available version is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML12184A047.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The amendments would revise the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule as approved in license amendment issued on July 20, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11152A043).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. The proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to these established safety margins as result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. William C. Dennis, Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 Hamilton Avenue, White Plains, NY 10601.

NRC Branch Chief: George Wilson.

Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (VY), LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-271, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon, Vermont

Date of amendment request: July 2, 2012. A publicly available version is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML121910298.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards

information (SUNSI). The amendments would revise the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule as approved in license amendment issued on July 20, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11152A013).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. The proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to these established safety margins as result of this change, the proposed

change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. William C. Dennis, Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 Hamilton Avenue, White Plains, NY 10601.

NRC Branch Chief: George Wilson.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, Pope County, Arkansas

Date of amendment request: June 18, 2012. A publicly available version of the application is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML12192A102.

Description of amendment request: This application contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). Entergy, the licensee, is planning to implement the requirements of Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule Milestone 6, approved by the NRC staff by letter dated July 27, 2011 (Amendment Nos. 244 and 294, for Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, respectively), in a slightly different manner than described in the approved Implementation Schedule. Although no change to the Implementation Schedule date is proposed, the change to the description of the milestone activity is considered to be a change to the Implementation Schedule, and in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy is submitting this request for an amendment to the physical protection license condition in the facility operating licenses.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant

systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to established safety margins as a result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Associate General Counsel—Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 70113.

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy Resources, Inc., South Mississippi Electric Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, Inc., Docket No. 50–416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne County, Mississippi

Date of amendment request: June 27, 2012. A publicly available version is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML12215A381.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The amendment would revise License Amendment No. 186 to the Facility Operating License for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS), dated July 27, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111940165), which approved the GGNS Cyber Security Plan and associated implementation milestone schedule. The Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule contained in the licensee's letter dated April 4, 2011 (ADAMS Access No. ML11103A042), was utilized, as a portion of the basis for the NRC's safety evaluation report provided by Amendment No. 186. The proposed amendment does not change the Implementation Schedule date, but Entergy has proposed this amendment to implement the requirements of Implementation Schedule Milestone 6 in a slightly different manner than described in the approved Implementation Schedule.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to established safety margins as a result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluisse, Associate General Counsel—Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana 70113.

NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Florida Power and Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–250 and 50–251, Turkey Point Nuclear Generating (TPN), Units 3 and 4, Florida City, Florida

Date of amendment request: June 13, 2012. A publicly available version of the application is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML12227A452.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed amendments would change the cyber security plan implementation schedule for Milestone 6 at TPN, Units 3 and 4. The NRC issued license Amendment Nos. 245 and 241 to the renewed facility operating licenses for TPN Units 3 and

4, respectively, which approved the TPN Cyber Security Plan and associated implementation milestone schedule.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed scope change to Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule milestone 6 is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications that affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed scope change to Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule milestone 6 is administrative in nature. This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications that affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create a possibility for an accident of a new or different type than those previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed scope change to Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule milestone 6 is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to these established safety margins as a result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, Attorney, Florida Power & Light, P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420.

NRC Acting Branch Chief: Jessie F. Quichocho.

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Docket No. 50-331, Duane Arnold Energy Center, Linn County, Iowa

Date of amendment request: June 13, 2012. A publicly available version of the application is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML12230A072.

Description of amendment request: This application contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, (the licensee), is planning to implement the requirements of Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule Milestone 6, approved by the NRC staff in a letter dated July 29, 2011 (Amendment No. 278, for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC)), in a slightly different manner than described in the approved Implementation Schedule. Although no change to the Implementation Schedule date is proposed, the change to the description of the milestone activity is conservatively considered to be a change to the Implementation Schedule, and in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.4 and 50.90, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold is submitting this request for an amendment to the facility operating license for DAEC.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications that

affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications that affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to these established safety margins as result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Mitchell S. Ross, P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420.

NRC Acting Branch Chief: Istvan Frankl.

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowac County, Wisconsin

Date of amendment request: June 18, 2012.

Description of amendment request:

This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed amendment would make changes to the cyber security plan implementation schedule for Milestone 6 at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2. NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra) is planning to implement the requirements of Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule Milestone 6, as approved by the NRC staff in a letter dated July 21, 2011 (Amendment Nos. 243 and 247, for PBNP Units 1 and 2, respectively), in a slightly different manner than described in the approved Implementation Schedule. Although no change to the Implementation Schedule is proposed, the change to the description of the milestone activity is conservatively considered to be a change to the Implementation Schedule; therefore, in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 50.90, NextEra is requesting an amendment to the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for PBNP Units 1 and 2, as it relates to the Physical Protection license condition associated with the PBNP Cyber Security Plan.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications that affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents, and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any accident initiators, or affect the function

of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications that affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents, and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to these established safety margins as result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: William Blair, Senior Attorney, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, P. O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420.

NRC Acting Branch Chief: Istvan Frankl.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50-220, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Oswego County, New York

Date of amendment request: June 11, 2012. A publicly available version of the application is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML12170A868.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed amendment is for adoption of a new risk-informed performance-based (RI-PB) fire protection licensing basis which complies with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c); the guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.205, "Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection for Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating

Plants," 2001 Edition. This amendment request also follows the guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-02, "Guidance for Implementing a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program under 10 CFR 50.48(c)," Revision 2.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The purpose of the proposed amendment is to permit NMP1 to adopt a new fire protection licensing basis that complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(a) and (c) and the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.205. The NRC considers that NFPA 805 provides an acceptable methodology and performance criteria for licensees to identify fire protection requirements that are an acceptable alternative to the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R required fire protection features (69 FR 33536; June 16, 2004).

Operation of NMP1 in accordance with the proposed amendment does not increase the probability or consequences of accidents previously evaluated. Engineering analyses, which may include engineering evaluations, probabilistic safety assessments, and fire modeling calculations, have been performed to demonstrate that the performance-based requirements of NFPA 805 have been satisfied. The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) documents the analyses of design basis accidents at NMP1. The proposed amendment does not affect accident initiators, nor does it alter design assumptions, conditions, or configurations of the facility that would increase the probability of accidents previously evaluated. Further, the changes to be made for fire hazard protection and mitigation do not adversely affect the ability of structures, systems, or components to perform their design functions for accident mitigation, nor do they affect the postulated initiators or assumed failure modes for accidents described and evaluated in the UFSAR. Structures, systems, or components required to safely shutdown the reactor and to maintain it in a safe shutdown condition will remain capable of performing their design functions.

NFPA 805, taken as a whole, provides an acceptable alternative for satisfying General Design Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, meets the underlying intent of the NRC's existing fire protection regulations and guidance, and provides for defense-in-depth. The goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in Chapter 1 of the standard ensure that, if there are any increases in core damage frequency or risk, the increase will be small and consistent with the intent of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy.

The proposed amendment will not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of any accident previously evaluated, and equipment required to mitigate an accident remains capable of performing the assumed function(s). The applicable radiological dose criteria will continue to be met.

Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any kind of accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

Operation of NMP1 in accordance with the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change does not alter the requirements or functions for systems required during accident conditions. Implementation of the new fire protection licensing basis, which complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(a) and (c) and the guidance Regulatory Guide 1.205, will not result in new or different accidents.

The proposed amendment does not introduce new or different accident initiators, nor does it alter design assumptions, conditions, or configurations of the facility in such a manner as to introduce new or different accident initiators. The proposed amendment does not adversely affect the ability of structures, systems, or components to perform their design function. Structures, systems, or components required to safely shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition remain capable of performing their design functions.

The requirements of NFPA 805 address only fire protection and the impacts of fire on the plant that have previously been evaluated. Thus, implementation of the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident beyond those already analyzed in the UFSAR. No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures will be introduced, and there will be no adverse effect or challenges imposed on any safety-related system as a result of the proposed amendment.

Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?

Response: No.

The purpose of the proposed amendment is to permit NMP1 to adopt a new fire protection licensing basis which complies with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.48(a) and (c) and the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.205. The NRC considers that NFPA 805 provides an acceptable methodology and performance criteria for licensees to identify fire protection systems and features that are

an acceptable alternative to the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R required fire protection features (69 FR 33536; June 16, 2004).

The overall approach of NFPA 805 is consistent with the key principles for evaluating license basis changes, as described in Regulatory Guide 1.174, is consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy, and maintains sufficient safety margins. Engineering analyses, which may include engineering evaluations, probabilistic safety assessments, and fire modeling calculations, have been performed to demonstrate that the performance based methods do not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Operation of NMP1 in accordance with the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The proposed amendment does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected by this change. The proposed amendment does not adversely affect existing plant safety margins or the reliability of equipment assumed to mitigate accidents in the UFSAR. The proposed amendment does not adversely affect the ability of structures, systems, or components to perform their design function. Structures, systems, or components required to safely shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe shutdown condition remain capable of performing their design functions.

Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Carey W. Fleming, Senior Counsel, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC, 100 Constellation Way, Suite 200C, Baltimore, MD 21202.

NRC Branch Chief: George Wilson.

PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50–354, 50–272, and 50–311, Hope Creek Generating Station and Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of amendment request: July 26, 2012. A publicly available version is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML12209A394.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI). The proposed amendment would make changes to the Hope Creek Generating Station and Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Renewed Facility Operating

Licenses, to revise the physical protection license condition as it relates to the cyber security plan. Specifically, PSEG proposes a change to the scope of Implementation Milestone 6 to apply to only technical cyber security controls.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule are administrative in nature. The changes do not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed changes do not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and have no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule are administrative in nature. The proposed changes do not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed changes do not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. Because there is no change to these established safety margins as result of this change, the proposed

change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Jeffrie J. Keenan, PSEG Nuclear LLC—N21, P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.

NRC Branch Chief: Meena K. Khanna.

Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation

Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana

Energy Northwest, Docket No. 50–397, Columbia Generating Station, Benton County, Washington

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50–003, 50–247 and 50–286, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Westchester County, New York

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–255, Palisades Nuclear Plant, Van Buren County, Michigan

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–293, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth County, Massachusetts

Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (VY), LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–271, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon, Vermont

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50–313 and 50–368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, Pope County, Arkansas

Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy Resources, Inc., South Mississippi Electric Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, Inc., Docket No. 50–416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne County, Mississippi

Florida Power and Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–250 and 50–251, Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, Florida City, Florida

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Docket No. 50–331, Duane Arnold Energy Center, Linn County, Iowa

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, Docket Nos. 50–266 and 50–301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowac County, Wisconsin

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50–220, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Oswego County, New York

PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50–354, 50–272, and 50–311, Hope Creek Generating Station and Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

A. This Order contains instructions regarding how potential parties to this proceeding may request access to

documents containing sensitive unclassified information (including Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI)).

B. Within 10 days after publication of this notice of hearing and opportunity to petition for leave to intervene, any potential party who believes access to SUNSI is necessary to respond to this notice may request access to SUNSI. A "potential party" is any person who intends to participate as a party by demonstrating standing and filing an admissible contention under 10 CFR 2.309. Requests for access to SUNSI submitted later than 10 days after publication will not be considered absent a showing of good cause for the late filing, addressing why the request could not have been filed earlier.

C. The requestor shall submit a letter requesting permission to access SUNSI to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, and provide a copy to the Associate General Counsel for Hearings, Enforcement and Administration, Office of the General Counsel, Washington, DC 20555-0001. The expedited delivery or courier mail address for both offices is: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. The email address for the Office of the Secretary and the Office of the General Counsel are Hearing.Docket@nrc.gov and OGCmailcenter@nrc.gov, respectively.¹ The request must include the following information:

(1) A description of the licensing action with a citation to this **Federal Register** notice;

(2) The name and address of the potential party and a description of the potential party's particularized interest that could be harmed by the action identified in C.(1); and

(3) The identity of the individual or entity requesting access to SUNSI and the requestor's basis for the need for the information in order to meaningfully participate in this adjudicatory proceeding. In particular, the request must explain why publicly available

versions of the information requested would not be sufficient to provide the basis and specificity for a proffered contention.

D. Based on an evaluation of the information submitted under paragraph C.(3) above, as applicable, the NRC staff will determine within 10 days of receipt of the request whether:

(1) There is a reasonable basis to believe the petitioner is likely to establish standing to participate in this NRC proceeding; and

(2) The requestor has established a legitimate need for access to SUNSI.

E. If the NRC staff determines that the requestor satisfies both D.(1) and D.(2) above, the NRC staff will notify the requestor in writing that access to SUNSI has been granted. The written notification will contain instructions on how the requestor may obtain copies of the requested documents, and any other conditions that may apply to access to those documents. These conditions may include, but are not limited to, the signing of a Non-Disclosure Agreement or Affidavit, or Protective Order² setting forth terms and conditions to prevent the unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of SUNSI by each individual who will be granted access to SUNSI.

F. Filing of Contentions. Any contentions in these proceedings that are based upon the information received as a result of the request made for SUNSI must be filed by the requestor no later than 25 days after the requestor is granted access to that information. However, if more than 25 days remain between the date the petitioner is granted access to the information and the deadline for filing all other contentions (as established in the notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing), the petitioner may file its SUNSI contentions by that later deadline.

G. Review of Denials of Access.

(1) If the request for access to SUNSI is denied by the NRC staff after a determination on standing and requisite need, the NRC staff shall immediately notify the requestor in writing, briefly stating the reason or reasons for the denial.

(2) The requestor may challenge the NRC staff's adverse determination by

filing a challenge within 5 days of receipt of that determination with: (a) The presiding officer designated in this proceeding; (b) if no presiding officer has been appointed, the Chief Administrative Judge, or if he or she is unavailable, another administrative judge, or an administrative law judge with jurisdiction pursuant to 10 CFR 2.318(a); or (c) if another officer has been designated to rule on information access issues, with that officer.

H. Review of Grants of Access. A party other than the requestor may challenge an NRC staff determination granting access to SUNSI whose release would harm that party's interest independent of the proceeding. Such a challenge must be filed with the Chief Administrative Judge within 5 days of the notification by the NRC staff of its grant of access.

If challenges to the NRC staff determinations are filed, these procedures give way to the normal process for litigating disputes concerning access to information. The availability of interlocutory review by the Commission of orders ruling on such NRC staff determinations (whether granting or denying access) is governed by 10 CFR 2.311.³

I. The Commission expects that the NRC staff and presiding officers (and any other reviewing officers) will consider and resolve requests for access to SUNSI, and motions for protective orders, in a timely fashion in order to minimize any unnecessary delays in identifying those petitioners who have standing and who have propounded contentions meeting the specificity and basis requirements in 10 CFR part 2. Attachment 1 to this Order summarizes the general target schedule for processing and resolving requests under these procedures.

It is so ordered.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of September, 2012.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.

¹ While a request for hearing or petition to intervene in this proceeding must comply with the filing requirements of the NRC's "E-Filing Rule," the initial request to access SUNSI under these procedures should be submitted as described in this paragraph.

² Any motion for Protective Order or draft Non-Disclosure Affidavit or Agreement for SUNSI must be filed with the presiding officer or the Chief Administrative Judge if the presiding officer has not yet been designated, within 30 days of the deadline for the receipt of the written access request.

³ Requestors should note that the filing requirements of the NRC's E-Filing Rule (72 FR 49139; August 28, 2007) apply to appeals of NRC staff determinations (because they must be served on a presiding officer or the Commission, as applicable), but not to the initial SUNSI request submitted to the NRC staff under these procedures.

ATTACHMENT 1—GENERAL TARGET SCHEDULE FOR PROCESSING AND RESOLVING REQUESTS FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED NON-SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION IN THIS PROCEEDING

Day	Event/Activity
0	Publication of Federal Register notice of hearing and opportunity to petition for leave to intervene, including order with instructions for access requests.
10	Deadline for submitting requests for access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI) with information: Supporting the standing of a potential party identified by name and address; describing the need for the information in order for the potential party to participate meaningfully in an adjudicatory proceeding.
60	Deadline for submitting petition for intervention containing: (i) Demonstration of standing; (ii) all contentions whose formulation does not require access to SUNSI (+25 Answers to petition for intervention; +7 requestor/petitioner reply).
20	Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff informs the requestor of the staff's determination whether the request for access provides a reasonable basis to believe standing can be established and shows need for SUNSI. (NRC staff also informs any party to the proceeding whose interest independent of the proceeding would be harmed by the release of the information.) If NRC staff makes the finding of need for SUNSI and likelihood of standing, NRC staff begins document processing (preparation of redactions or review of redacted documents.)
25	If NRC staff finds no "need," no "need to know," or no likelihood of standing, the deadline for requestor/petitioner to file a motion seeking a ruling to reverse the NRC staff's denial of access; NRC staff files copy of access determination with the presiding officer (or Chief Administrative Judge or other designated officer, as appropriate). If NRC staff finds "need" for SUNSI, the deadline for any party to the proceeding whose interest independent of the proceeding would be harmed by the release of the information to file a motion seeking a ruling to reverse the NRC staff's grant of access.
30	Deadline for NRC staff reply to motions to reverse NRC staff determination(s).
40	(Receipt +30) If NRC staff finds standing and need for SUNSI, deadline for NRC staff to complete information processing and file motion for Protective Order and draft Non-Disclosure Affidavit. Deadline for applicant/licensee to file Non-Disclosure Agreement for SUNSI.
A	If access granted: Issuance of presiding officer or other designated officer decision on motion for protective order for access to sensitive information (including schedule for providing access and submission of contentions) or decision reversing a final adverse determination by the NRC staff.
A + 3	Deadline for filing executed Non-Disclosure Affidavits. Access provided to SUNSI consistent with decision issuing the protective order.
A + 28	Deadline for submission of contentions whose development depends upon access to SUNSI. However, if more than 25 days remain between the petitioner's receipt of (or access to) the information and the deadline for filing all other contentions (as established in the notice of hearing or opportunity for hearing), the petitioner may file its SUNSI contentions by that later deadline.
A + 53	(Contention receipt +25) Answers to contentions whose development depends upon access to SUNSI.
A + 60	(Answer receipt +7) Petitioner/Intervenor reply to answers.
>A + 60	Decision on contention admission.

[FR Doc. 2012-22307 Filed 9-10-12; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2012-0064]

Initial Test Program of Condensate and Feedwater Systems for Light-Water Reactors**AGENCY:** Nuclear Regulatory Commission.**ACTION:** Regulatory guide; issuance.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) is issuing Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.68.1, "Preoperational and Initial Startup Testing of Feedwater and Condensate Systems for Boiling Water Reactor Power Plants." This regulatory guide is being revised to: (1) Expand the scope of the guide to encompass preoperational, initial plant startup, and power ascension tests for the condensate and feedwater systems in all types of light water reactor facilities; and (2) to incorporate lessons learned by the NRC staff since the last revision.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0064 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may access information related to this document, which the NRC possesses and are publicly available, using any of the following methods:

- *Federal Rulemaking Web Site:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0064. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-492-3668; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.

- *NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):* You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC Library at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To begin the search, select "ADAMS Public Documents" and then select "Begin Web-based ADAMS Search." For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced in this notice (if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced. Revision 2 of

Regulatory Guide 1.68.1 is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML12160A169. The regulatory analysis may be found under ADAMS Accession No. ML12160A170.

- *NRC's PDR:* You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kurt Cozens, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-251-7448; email: Kurt.Cozens@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**I. Introduction**

The NRC is issuing a revision to an existing guide in the NRC's "Regulatory Guide" series. This series was developed to describe and make available to the public information such as methods that are acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing specific parts of the agency's regulations, techniques that the staff uses in evaluating specific problems or