

fractures, hematomas, bruises or other injuries to children's fingers, toes, or other parts of the body. 16 CFR 1500.18(a)(6).

A second CPSC regulation establishes criteria for exempting baby-bouncers, walker-jumpers, and baby-walkers from the banning rule under specified conditions. 16 CFR 1500.86(a)(4). The exemption regulation requires certain labeling on these products and their packaging to identify the name and address of the manufacturer or distributor and the model number of the product. Additionally, the exemption regulation requires that records must be established and maintained for three years relating to testing, inspection, sales, and distributions of these products. The regulation does not specify a particular form or format for the records. Manufacturers and importers may rely on records kept in the ordinary course of business to satisfy the recordkeeping requirements if those records contain the required information.

The OMB approved the collection of information requirements in the regulations under control number 3041-0019. OMB's most recent extension of approval expires on January 31, 2003. The CPSC now proposes to request an extension of approval without change for the regulations' information collection requirements.

The safety need for this collection of information remains. Specifically, if a manufacturer or importer distributes products that violate the banning rule, the records required by section 1500.86(a)(4) can be used by the firm and the CPSC (i) to identify specific models of products that fail to comply with applicable requirements, and (ii) to notify distributors and retailers if the products are subject to recall.

B. Estimated Burden

The CPSC staff estimates that about 28 firms are subject to the testing and recordkeeping requirements of the regulations. The CPSC staff estimates further that the burden imposed by the regulations on each of these firms is approximately 2 hours per year. Thus, the total annual burden imposed by the regulations on all manufacturers and importers is about 56 hours.

The CPSC staff estimates that the hourly wage for the time required to perform the required testing and to maintain the required records is about \$28.40 (rate for total compensation of technical workers, 2002), and that the annual total cost to the industry is approximately \$1,590.40.

During a typical year, the CPSC will expend approximately two days of

professional staff time reviewing records required to be maintained by the regulations for baby-bouncers, walker-jumpers, and baby-walkers. The annual cost to the Federal government of the collection of information in these regulations is estimated to be \$680 (based on \$42.50/hour staff time).

C. Request for Comments

The Commission solicits written comments from all interested persons about the proposed collection of information. The Commission specifically solicits information relevant to the following topics:

- Whether the collection of information described above is necessary for the proper performance of the Commission's functions, including whether the information would have practical utility;
- Whether the estimated burden of the proposed collection of information is accurate;
- Whether the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected could be enhanced; and
- Whether the burden imposed by the collection of information could be minimized by use of automated, electronic or other technological collection techniques, or other forms of information technology.

Dated: October 3, 2002.

Todd A. Stevenson,
Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission.

[FR Doc. 02-25633 Filed 10-8-02; 8:45 am]

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CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

Notification of Request for Extension of Approval of Information Collection Requirements; Notification Requirements Under Safety Regulations for Coal and Woodburning Appliances

AGENCY: Consumer Product Safety Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: In the July 9, 2002 **Federal Register** (67 FR 45483), the Consumer Product Safety Commission published a notice in accordance with provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35) to announce the agency's intention to seek an extension of approval through October 31, 2005, of information collection requirements in the safety regulations for coal and woodburning appliances (16 CFR part 1406). No responses were received in response to the notice. The Commission

now announces that it has submitted to the Office of Management and Budget a request for extension of approval of that collection of information.

These regulations require manufacturers and importers of certain coal and woodburning appliances to provide safety information to consumers on labels and instructions and an explanation of how certain clearance distances in those labels and instructions were determined. The requirements to provide copies of labels and instructions to the Commission have been in effect since May 16, 1984. For this reason, the information burden imposed by this rule is limited to manufacturers and importers introducing new products or models, or making changes to labels, instructions, or information previously provided to the Commission. The purposes of the reporting requirements in part 1406 are to reduce risks of injuries from fires associated with the installation, operation, and maintenance of the appliances that are subject to the rule, and to assist the Commission in determining the extent to which manufacturers and importers comply with the requirements in part 1406.

Additional Information About the Request for Extension of Approval of Information Collection Requirements

Agency address: Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, DC 20207.

Title of information collection: Notification Requirements for Coal and Woodburning Appliances, 16 CFR part 1406.

Type of request: Extension of approval.

Frequency of collection: Labeling, plus one-time requirement for reporting of new models or changes.

General description of respondents: Manufacturers and importers of coal and woodburning appliances.

Estimated Number of respondents: 5.

Estimated average number of responses per respondent: 1 per year.

Estimated number of responses for all respondents: 5 per year.

Estimated number of hours per response: 3.

Estimated number of hours for all respondents: 15 per year.

Estimated cost of collection for all respondents: \$397.

Comments: Comments on this request for extension of approval of information collection requirements should be submitted by November 8, 2002 to (1) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attn: OMB Desk Officer for CPSC, Office of Management and Budget, Washington DC 20503;

telephone: (202) 395-7340, and (2) the Office of the Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, DC 20207. Written comments may also be sent to the Office of the Secretary by facsimile at (301) 504-0127 or by e-mail at cpsc-os@cpsc.gov.

Copies of this request for an extension of an information collection requirement are available from Linda Glatz, management and program analyst, Office of Planning and Evaluation, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, DC 20207; telephone: (301) 504-0416, extension 2226.

Dated: October 2, 2002.

Todd A. Stevenson,

Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission.

[FR Doc. 02-25632 Filed 10-8-02; 8:45 am]

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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 2002-1]

Quality Assurance for Safety-Related Software

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice, recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5) concerning quality assurance for safety-related software.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation are due on or before November 8, 2002.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or telephone (202) 694-7000.

Dated: October 1, 2002.

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

September 23, 2002.

Background

Two core Integrated Safety Management (ISM) functions evolving from the Department of Energy's (DOE) implementation of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board)

Recommendation 95-2, *Safety Management* are: (1) Analyzing hazards; and (2) identifying and implementing controls to prevent and/or mitigate potential accidents. DOE relies heavily on computer software to analyze hazards, and design and operate controls that prevent or mitigate potential accidents.

DOE and its contractors use many codes to evaluate the consequences of potential accidents. Safety controls and their functional classifications are often based on these evaluations. Functional classifications establish the level of rigor to which controls are designed, procured, maintained, and inspected. The robustness and reliability of many structures, systems, and components (SSCs) throughout DOE's defense nuclear complex depend on the quality of the software used to analyze and to guide these decisions, the quality of the software used to design or develop controls, and proficiency in use of the software. In addition, software that performs safety-related functions in distributed control systems, supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA), and programmable logic controllers (PLC) requires the same high quality needed to provide adequate protection for the public, the workers, and the environment. Other types of software, such as databases used in safety management activities, can also serve important safety functions and deserve a degree of quality assurance commensurate with their safety significance.

In some areas where there is at present no substantial activity in development of new software for safety applications, new calculations are usually based on existing codes, with data inputs and some logic chains often modified to fit the problems of the moment. It is therefore necessary to ensure that software so modified is not placed in general use in competition with generally validated and more widely useable software.

Software quality assurance (SQA) provides measures designed to ensure that computer software will perform its intended functions. Such measures must be applied during the design, testing, documentation, and subsequent use of the software, and must be maintained throughout the software life cycle. It is generally accepted that an effective SQA program ensures that:

- All requirements, including the safety requirements, are properly specified.
- Models are a valid representation of the physical phenomena of interest, and digital control functions are properly executed.

- Input and embedded data are accurate.

- Software undergoes an appropriate verification and validation process.

- Results are in reasonable agreement with available benchmark data.

- All internal logic states of PLCs and SCADA are understood, so that no sequence of inputs, even those due to component failure, can leave the controlled system in an unexpected or unanalyzed state.

- Computer codes are properly and consistently executed by analysts.

- Code modifications and improvements are controlled, subjected to regression and re-acceptance testing, and documented.

DOE identified inadequate SQA as a problem as early as December 1989, when its Office of Environment, Safety and Health (DOE-EH) issued ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY & HEALTH BULLETIN EH-89-9, *Technical Software Quality Assurance Issues*. This bulletin states, "Inadequate SQA for scientific and technical codes at any phase in their 'life cycle' may not only result in lost time and/or excessive project costs, but may also endanger equipment and public or occupational sectors." The bulletin cites problems with all three types of software noted above (analysis, design, and operation). Likewise, a 1997 assessment performed by DOE's Accident Phenomenology and Consequence Assessment Methodology Evaluation Program determined that only a small fraction of accident analysis computer codes meet current industry SQA standards. SQA problems continue to persist, as documented in the Board's technical report DNFSB/TECH-25, *Quality Assurance for Safety-Related Software at Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities*, issued in January 2000.

An integrated and effective SQA infrastructure still does not exist within DOE. This situation can lead to both errors in technical output from software used in safety analyses and incorrect performance of instrumentation and controls for safety-related systems. In a letter to DOE dated January 20, 2000, the Board identified these deficiencies and requested that DOE provide a corrective action plan within 60 days. On October 3, 2000, the Board received DOE's corrective action plan, but found that it did not sufficiently respond to the Board's concerns. On October 23, 2000, the Board asked for a new plan of action; DOE has never submitted a revised plan, although several deliverables under the original plan have been received.

During the Board's August 15, 2001, public meeting on quality assurance,