delay or denial of signature updates would leave these users vulnerable to malicious actors who could target exploitation of known devices and networks.

In its Written Submission, Kaspersky argued that it has implemented multiple safeguards to prevent malicious code from being introduced to a user's device.[21] These arguments have been considered and are addressed by the Department in greater detail in Appendix A. At a general level, the safeguards identified would not address a fundamental aspect of the risk—namely, that Kaspersky does not have to affirmatively inject malware through its own code. Instead, through its persistent access to devices, Kaspersky can provide information about the devices on which its software operates, to enable malicious cyber actors—whether in the Russian government or aligned therewith—to gain access to those devices and manipulate settings on the device. Additionally, Kaspersky's global virus scanning operation puts it at the forefront for identifying new vulnerabilities in existing software, providing it with significant non-public information for ways to exploit certain versions of software, as well as a list of devices that run that software. This capability, if leveraged by the Russian government, greatly enhances its ability to conduct cyber espionage and to steal sensitive data.

In its Written Submission, Kaspersky also proposed additional technical and operational mitigation measures to address this aspect of the undue or unacceptable risk.[22] As described in Appendix A, the Department concluded that these measures, when considered both individually and in combination with one another, do not sufficiently address the identified risk. The Department determined they fail largely for the same reasons described above regarding the company's existing safeguards. Specifically, the proposed technical and operational mitigation measures address neither the risks associated with intentional withholding of new threat signatures nor the risks associated with Kaspersky's ability to use its kernel-level access to U.S. user systems for a variety of malign purposes.

Final Determination

Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.,* E.O. 13873, and 15 CFR 7.109, and in light of its assessment of the aforementioned risks, as described above and in further detail in Appendix A, including the consideration and determination of insufficiency of Kaspersky's proposed measures to mitigate the risks identified, the Department hereby issues this Final Determination regarding the following ICTS transactions, as that term is defined under 15 CFR 7.2, with U.S. persons:

1. ICTS transactions involving any cybersecurity product or service designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, in whole or in part, by Kaspersky, to include those products and services listed in Appendix B;

2. ICTS transactions involving any anti-virus software designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, in whole or in part, by Kaspersky to include those products and services listed in Appendix B; and

3. ICTS transactions involving the integration of software designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, in whole or in part, by Kaspersky into third-party products or services (*e.g.,* ''white-labeled'' products or services).

Effective at 12 a.m. EDT on July 20, 2024, in accordance with 15 CFR 7.109(d)(5), Kaspersky, and any of its successors and assignees, is prohibited from entering into any new agreement with U.S. persons involving one or more ICTS transactions identified above.

Effective 12 a.m. EDT on September 29, 2024, in accordance with 15 CFR 7.109(d)(5), Kaspersky, and any of its successors or assignees, shall be prohibited from engaging in the identified ICTS transactions in the United States or with U.S. persons, including (1) providing any anti-virus signature updates and codebase updates associated with the ICTS transactions identified above; and (2) operating KSN in the United States or on any U.S. person's information technology system. Kaspersky may continue to operate the KSN for U.S. persons, as well as provide anti-virus signature updates and codebase updates to current U.S. subscribers and users of cybersecurity and anti-virus products and services as identified in Appendix B, until 12:00 a.m. EDT on September 29, 2024.

Pursuant to the above determination, effective 12:00 a.m. EDT on September 29, 2024, any resale of Kaspersky cybersecurity or anti-virus software, integration of Kaspersky cybersecurity or anti-virus software into other products and services, or licensing of Kaspersky cybersecurity or anti-virus software for purposes of resale or integration into other products or services is prohibited in the United States or by U.S. persons.

This Final Determination shall not apply to transactions involving Kaspersky Threat Intelligence products and services, Kaspersky Security Training products and services, or Kaspersky consulting or advisory services (including SOC Consulting, Security Consulting, Ask the Analyst, and Incident Response) that are purely informational or educational in nature.

In accordance with 15 CFR 7.200, any person who violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes any knowing violation of this Final Determination prohibiting certain classes of ICTS transactions is subject to civil penalties. In accordance with 15 CFR 7.200, any person who willfully commits, willfully attempts to commit, or willfully conspires to commit, or aids and abets in the commission of a violation of this Final Determination prohibiting certain classes of ICTS transactions is subject to criminal penalties.

This document of the Department of Commerce was signed on June 14, 2024, by Gina M. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce. The document with the original signature and date is maintained by the Department of Commerce. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned Department of Commerce Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of the Department of Commerce. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the **Federal Register**.

Signed in Washington, DC, on June 14, 2024.

Beth Grossman,

Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Commerce.

[FR Doc. 2024–13532 Filed 6–20–24; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 3510–33–P

[21] January 3rd Response at 10.

[22] January 3rd Response at 13–14.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A–428–852, A–533–924, A–588–882, A–421–817, A–518–001, A–274–810]

Melamine From Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago: Postponement of Preliminary Determinations in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigations

AGENCY: Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce.

DATES: Applicable June 24, 2024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Noah Wetzel (Germany), Myrna Lobo (India), George McMahon (Japan), Fred Baker (the Netherlands), Gorden Struck (Qatar), or Brittany Bauer (Trinidad and Tobago), AD/CVD Operations, Offices II, V, VI, VII, and VIII, Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482–7466, (202) 482–2371, (202) 482–1167, (202) 482–2924, (202) 482–8151, and (202) 482–3860, respectively.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On March 5, 2024, the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) initiated less-than-fair-value (LTFV) investigations of imports of melamine from Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago.[1] Currently, the preliminary determinations are due no later than July 23, 2024. The period of investigation is January 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023.

Postponement of Preliminary Determinations

Section 733(b)(1)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act), requires Commerce to issue the preliminary determination in an LTFV investigation within 140 days after the date on which Commerce initiated the investigation. However, section 733(c)(1) of the Act permits Commerce to postpone the preliminary determination until no later than 190 days after the date on which Commerce initiated the investigation if: (A) the petitioner makes a timely request for a postponement; or (B) Commerce concludes that the parties concerned are cooperating, that the investigation is extraordinarily complicated, and that additional time is necessary to make a preliminary determination. Under 19 CFR 351.205(e), the petitioner must submit a request for postponement 25 days or more before the scheduled date of the preliminary determination and must state the reasons for the request. Commerce will grant the request unless it finds compelling reasons to deny the request.

On June 13, 2024, the petitioner[2] submitted a timely request that Commerce postpone the preliminary determinations in the LTFV investigations of imports of melamine from Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago. The petitioners stated that ''{w}ith regard to the *Melamine from India* and *Melamine from Qatar* investigations, postponement is warranted so that Commerce can evaluate fully the initial questionnaire responses submitted by the mandatory respondents and solicit supplemental information as necessary,'' and the petitioner ''seeks postponement of all six antidumping investigations in order to keep them on the same schedule and avoid the need to split the cases at the International Trade Commission.'' [3]

For the reasons stated above and because there are no compelling reasons to deny the request, in accordance with section 733(c)(1)(A) of the Act and 19 CFR 351.205(e), Commerce is postponing the deadline for the preliminary determinations by 50 days (*i.e.,* to 190 days after the date on which these investigations were initiated). As a result, Commerce will issue its preliminary determinations in the above-referenced investigations no later than September 11, 2024. In accordance with section 735(a)(1) of the Act and 19 CFR 351.210(b)(1), the deadline for the final determinations of these investigations will continue to be 75 days after the date of the preliminary determinations, unless postponed at a later date.

Notification to Interested Parties

This notice is issued and published pursuant to section 733(c)(2) of the Act and 19 CFR 351.205(f)(1).

Dated: June 18, 2024.

Ryan Majerus,

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Negotiations, performing the non-exclusive functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance.

[FR Doc. 2024–13790 Filed 6–21–24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P

[1] *See Melamine from Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigations,* 89 FR 17413 (March 11, 2024).

[2] The petitioner is Cornerstone Chemical Company.

[3] *See* Petitioners' Letter, ''Petitioner's Request for Postponement of the Preliminary Determinations,'' dated June 13, 2024.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Institute of Standards and Technology

National Artificial Intelligence Advisory Committee

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of open meeting.

SUMMARY: The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announces that the National Artificial Intelligence Advisory Committee (NAIAC or Committee) will hold a series of virtual briefing sessions. These sessions will be held via web conference on Tuesday, July 9, 2024, Wednesday, July 10, 2024, and July 11, 2024, from 2:00 p.m.–3:30 p.m. Eastern Time each day. The primary purpose of these meetings is to have invited guests brief the full Committee on topics of interest related to the Committee's year three efforts. The briefings are from outside subject matter experts to the full Committee from areas such as industry, nonprofit organizations, the scientific community, the defense and law enforcement communities, and other appropriate organizations. The final agenda will be posted on the NIST website at *https://www.nist.gov/itl/national-artificial-intelligence-advisory-committee-naiac.*

DATES: The NAIAC will meet on Tuesday, July 9, 2024, Wednesday, July 10, 2024, and July 11, 2024, from 2:00 p.m.–3:30 p.m. Eastern Time.

ADDRESSES: The meetings will be held via webinar. Please note participation instructions under the **SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION** section of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Cheryl L. Gendron, Designated Federal Officer, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Telephone: (301) 975–2785, Email address: *cheryl.gendron@nist.gov.* Please direct any inquiries to the committee at *naiac@nist.gov.*

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 1001 *et seq.,* notice is hereby given that the NAIAC will meet virtually as set forth in the **DATES** section of this notice. The meetings will be open to the public.

The NAIAC is authorized by section 5104 of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (Pub. L. 116–283), in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (FACA), 5 U.S.C. 1001 *et seq.* The Committee advises the President and the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Office on matters related to the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative. Additional information on the NAIAC is available at *ai.gov/naiac/.*

The primary purpose of these meetings is to have invited guests brief the full Committee on topics of interest related to the Committee's year three efforts. The briefings are from outside subject matter experts to the full Committee from areas such as industry, nonprofit organizations, the scientific