

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**[Docket No: DHS–2025–0027]****Notice of Availability of a Draft Programmatic Environmental Assessment for the Nationwide Operation of Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems****AGENCY:** Department of Homeland Security.**ACTION:** Notice of availability; request for comments.

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announces the availability of a draft programmatic environmental assessment (PEA) and its draft finding that the research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) of counter unmanned aircraft systems (C–UAS), and nationwide C–UAS operational and training activities will not significantly impact the environment. The draft PEA will inform DHS’s decision whether to perform such activities with C–UAS nationwide.

DATES: Comments must be submitted on or before September 3, 2025.

ADDRESSES: The draft PEA and draft Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) are available on DHS’s website at: <https://www.dhs.gov/ocrso/eed/epb/nepa>.

Comments may be submitted by either of the following methods:

- *Regulations.gov web portal:* Navigate to <https://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket No. DHS–2025–0027 to submit public comments. Follow the online instructions for submitting comments. All public comments received are subject to the Freedom of Information Act and will be posted in their entirety at this site and available for public viewing. Do not include any information you would not like to be made publicly available.

- *By email:* Emailed comments should be sent to: Jennifer Hass, Acting Executive Director, Energy and Environment Division, at EED-EP@hq.dhs.gov.

All comments received may be made publicly available without change, including any personal information provided.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jennifer Hass, Acting Executive Director, Energy and Environment Division, Department of Homeland Security at EED-EP@hq.dhs.gov or by phone at 202–834–4346.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Proposed Action: DHS proposes to perform RDT&E of C–UAS, and conduct operational and training activities to

support existing and emerging DHS mission requirements nationwide. C–UAS are a system or device capable of tracking, disabling, disrupting, or seizing control of an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system (UAS). UAS have become a security concern in recent years due to the ease with which they can aid in intelligence gathering and be used for malicious activities. DHS has been granted statutory authority under the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 to counter credible threats from UAS to the safety or security of a covered facility or asset, which are designated based on their importance to the security missions of DHS and Components. DHS prepared the subject Draft PEA to streamline the review process and review duplicative, lengthy reviews for repetitive C–UAS actions that may be broadly analyzed given their similar scopes.

The purpose of the Proposed Action is to support ongoing and proposed RDT&E of C–UAS technologies and to deploy C–UAS in operational and training settings to detect, identify, monitor, track, and mitigate (passively and actively) threats posed by UAS, including across the radio-frequency spectrum, using a streamlined approach to environmental analysis and documentation. The Proposed Action is needed to enhance DHS’s ability to use C–UAS technologies, monitor emerging threats, protect DHS’s missions, and defend the Nation from UAS threats and malicious activity. The use of C–UAS would support existing and emerging mission requirements of the various Components within DHS and facilitate their services and strategies essential to the Nation’s security, safety, and emergency response.

The Draft PEA evaluates the potential environmental, cultural, socioeconomic, and physical impacts associated with DHS’s Proposed Action.

Alternatives: In addition to the Proposed Action Alternative, which would implement the Proposed Action, DHS considered a No Action Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative, DHS would continue to use C–UAS to counter threats as authorized under the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 on a project-by-project basis. However, DHS would be limited in its ability to carry out critical mission objectives and respond to potential threats in a streamlined, efficient manner.

Draft Finding of No Significant Impact: The evaluation performed within this draft PEA concludes that no significant adverse impact to the environmental or quality of life is anticipated as a result of implementing

the Proposed Action, provided that routine best management practices specified in the draft PEA are implemented.

Request for Public Review: Federal agencies; Tribal, state, and local governments, the public; and other interested parties are requested to provide input or comments on the draft PEA, which will be available for a 30-day public comment period. Comments must be submitted on or before September 3, 2025. For information on how to submit, see the **ADDRESSES** section above. A mailing address to submit hardcopy comments can be provided upon request.

Availability of the Draft PEA: The draft PEA and draft FONSI are available on DHS’s website at: <https://www.dhs.gov/ocrso/eed/epb/nepa/public-comment>.

(Authority: National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 *et seq.*), DHS Management Directive 023–01, rev. 01 (Implementation of NEPA), and DHS Instruction Manual 023–01–001–01, rev. 01 (Implementation of the NEPA).)

Jennifer Hass,

Acting Executive Director, Energy and Environment Division, Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer, Department of Homeland Security.

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**Transportation Security Administration****Intent To Request Revision From OMB of One Current Public Collection of Information: Critical Facility Information From the Top 100 Most Critical Pipeline Operators**

AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration, DHS.

ACTION: 60-Day Notice.

SUMMARY: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) invites public comment on one currently approved Information Collection Request (ICR), Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number 1652–0050, abstracted below that we will submit to OMB for a revision in compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). The ICR describes the nature of the information collection and its expected burden. The collection involves critical facility security information.

DATES: Send your comments by October 3, 2025.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be emailed to TSAPRA@dhs.gov or delivered to the

TSA PRA Officer, Information Technology (IT), TSA-11, Transportation Security Administration, 6595 Springfield Center Drive, Springfield, VA 20598-6011.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Christina A. Walsh at the above address, or by telephone (571) 227-2062.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 *et seq.*), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. The ICR documentation will be available at <https://www.reginfo.gov> upon its submission to OMB. Therefore, in preparation for OMB review and approval of the following information collection, TSA is soliciting comments to—

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility;

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and

(4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including using appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

Information Collection Requirement

OMB Control Number 1652-0050; *Critical Facility Information of the Top 100 Most Critical Pipelines*: The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) specifically required TSA to develop and implement a plan for reviewing the pipeline security plans and inspecting the critical facilities of the 100 most critical pipeline operators.¹ Pipeline owner/operators determine which facilities qualify as critical facilities based on guidance and criteria set forth in the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines published in December 2010 and 2011, with an update published in April 2021. To execute the 9/11 Act mandate, TSA visits critical pipeline facilities and collects site-specific information from pipeline owner/operators on facility

security policies, procedures, and physical security measures.

TSA collects facility security information during the site visits using a Critical Facility Security Review (CFSR) form. The CFSR looks at individual pipeline facility security measures and procedures.² This collection is voluntary. Information collected from the reviews is analyzed and used to determine strengths and weaknesses at the nation's critical pipeline facilities, areas to target for risk reduction strategies, pipeline industry implementation of the voluntary guidelines, and the potential need for regulations in accordance with the 9/11 Act provision previously cited.

TSA visits with pipeline owner/operators to follow up on their implementation of security improvements and recommendations made during facility visits. During critical facility visits, TSA documents and provides recommendations to improve the security posture of the facility. TSA intends to continue to follow up with pipeline owner/operators via email on their status toward implementation of the recommendations made during the critical facility visits. The follow up will be conducted at intervals of 6, 12, and 18 months after the facility visit.

In addition to the voluntary requirements, in May 2021, TSA added mandatory requirements to the collection. In order to address the ongoing cybersecurity threat to pipeline systems and associated infrastructure, TSA issued a Security Directive (SD) applicable to owner/operators of a hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline or liquefied natural gas facility notified by TSA that their pipeline system or facility is critical. These owner/operators were required to review Section 7 of TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines and assess current activities, using the TSA Pipeline Cybersecurity Self-Assessment form, to address cyber risk, and identify remediation measures that will be taken to fill those gaps and a timeframe for achieving those measures. The form provided is based on the instrument used for the CFSRs, limited to cybersecurity issues and augmented to address the scope of the SD. The critical pipeline owner/operators were required to report the results of this assessment

to TSA within 30 days of issuance of the SD.

TSA is revising the collection to remove the mandatory requirements. All of the owner/operators have satisfied the SD's requirements, and TSA expects that going forward, fewer than 10 owner/operators would respond to the collection annually. In addition, TSA is revising the title of the collection from "Critical Facility Information of the Top 100 Most Critical Pipeline" to "Critical Facility Information from the Top 100 Most Critical Pipeline Operators" to more accurately align with the statutory requirements. TSA is seeking renewal of this information collection for the maximum 3-year approval period.

To the extent information provided by operators for each information collection is Sensitive Security Information, TSA will protect in accordance with procedures meeting the transmission, handling, and storage requirements of Sensitive Security Information set forth in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

TSA estimates the annual hour burden for the information collection related to the voluntary collection of the CFSR form to be 320 hours. TSA will conduct a maximum of 80 facility reviews each year, with each review taking approximately 4 hours (320 = 80 × 4).

TSA estimates the annual hour burden for the information collection related to TSA follow ups on the recommendations based on the above CFSRs made to facility owner/operators to be 480 hours. TSA estimates each owner/operator will spend approximately 2 hours to submit a response to TSA regarding its voluntary implementation of security recommendations made during each critical facility visit. If a maximum of 80 critical facilities are reviewed each year, and TSA follows up with each facility owner/operator every 6, 12, and 18 months following the visit, the total annual burden is 480 (80 × 2 × 3) hours.

The total estimated burden for the entire information collection is 800 hours annually – 320 hours for the CFSR form and 480 hours for the recommendations follow-up procedures.

Dated: July 30, 2025.

Christina A. Walsh,

*Paperwork Reduction Act Officer,
Information Technology, Transportation
Security Administration.*

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¹ See sec. 1557 of the 9/11 Act, Pub. L. 110-53 (121 Stat. 266, 475; Aug. 3, 2007), as codified at 6 U.S.C. 1207.

² The CFSR differs from a Corporate Security Review conducted by TSA in another information collection that looks at corporate or company-wide security management plans and practices for pipeline operators. See OMB Control No. 1652-0056 at <https://www.reginfo.gov> for the PRA approval of information collection for these Corporate Security Reviews.