controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' *Id.* § 823(f). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the Act, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices medicine. *See, e.g., Calvin Ramsey,* 76 FR 20034, 20036 (2011); *Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D.,* 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); *Dominick A. Ricci,* 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); *Bobby Watts,* 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988); *see also Frederick Marsh Blanton,* 43 FR 27616 (1978).

Based on the Board's Final Order of Automatic Suspension, it is undisputed that Respondent is no longer currently authorized to dispense controlled substances in Pennsylvania, the State in which he is registered with the Agency. Respondent is therefore not entitled to maintain his registration. This provides reason alone to revoke his registration and to deny any pending application for registration in Pennsylvania.[2]

Respondent's Criminal Convictions

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2), the Attorney General may also suspend or revoke a registration issued under section 823 of Title 21, ''upon a finding that the registrant . . . has been convicted of a felony under this subchapter'' (the Controlled Substances Act). Here too, it is undisputed that Respondent has been convicted of more than 100 different felony violations of the CSA, including two of counts of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 846; 117 counts of distribution of controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and (b)(1)(E); and one count of distribution of controlled substances resulting in death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). While Respondent asserts that his convictions are not final because his case is on direct appeal, the District Court has entered the judgment and Respondent, who is currently incarcerated in a United States Penitentiary, points to no order by the Court vacating the judgment.[3] Accordingly, I find that Respondent ''has been convicted of a felony under this subchapter,'' thus subjecting his registration to sanction. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2).

In contrast to a practitioner's loss of his state authority, this finding does not mandate the revocation of his registration on this ground and the Agency has held that a conviction is not a *per se* bar to registration (as is the loss of state authority). *See Jeffery M. Freesemann,* 76 FR 60873 n.1 (2011) (citing *The Lawsons,* 72 FR 74334, 74338 (2007)); *Michael S. Moore,* 76 FR 45867 (2011). Here, however, Respondent's criminal conduct, which involves 120 felony convictions for unlawful distribution, including for unlawful distribution resulting in death, is so obviously egregious that revocation is warranted. *See Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc.,* v. *DEA,* 861 F.3d 206, 226 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (recognizing Agency's authority to revoke a registration based on extensive and egregious misconduct even if registrant had accepted responsibility); *see also Hatem Attaya,* 81 FR 8221, 8244 (2016) (''[W]hile proceedings under 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824 are remedial in nature, there are cases in which, notwithstanding a finding that a registrant has credibly accepted responsibility, the misconduct is so egregious and extensive that the protection of the public interest nonetheless warrants the revocation of a registration or the denial of an application.'') (citation omitted).

While ordinarily a respondent who has been convicted of a felony subject to section 824(a)(2) is entitled to present a case as to why his registration should not be revoked (or his application denied), I nonetheless conclude that the ALJ properly granted summary disposition in this matter because there is no issue of any disputed material fact. Here, even ignoring the manifest egregiousness of Respondent's criminal conduct, he has put forward no evidence to show why he can be entrusted with a registration nor raised any contention that he acknowledges his misconduct and has undertaken remedial measures.[4] *See Medicine Shoppe-Jonesborough,* 73 FR 364, 387 (2008) (other citations omitted). *Cf.* 10B Charles Allen Wright, *et al., Federal Practice and Procedure Civ.* § 2727.2 (4th ed. April 2017 update) (''If the summary-judgment movant makes out a prima facie case that would entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law if uncontroverted at trial, summary judgment will be granted unless the opposing party offers some competent evidence that could be presented at trial showing that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact.''). And finally, as the evidence shows that Respondent is only one year into a 30-year term of imprisonment, he has clearly discontinued (even if involuntarily) his professional practice. *Cf.* 21 CFR 1301.52 (''the registration of any person . . . shall terminate . . . if and when such person . . . discontinues business or professional practice''). Thus, even if his state license had not been suspended, his continued registration would violate DEA's longstanding policy barring shelf registrations. *See, e.g., Performance Construction, Inc.,* 67 FR 9993 (2002). Accordingly, I conclude that the ALJ properly granted summary disposition on this ground. I further conclude that Respondent's multiple felony convictions for violating the CSA provide an additional and independent basis for revoking his registration and denying any pending application.

Order

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a) and 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of Registration No. BO3937781 and DATA-Waiver Identification No. XO3937781 issued to William J. O'Brien, III, D.O., be, and they hereby are, revoked. I further order that any application of William J. O'Brien, III, D.O. to renew or modify this registration, or for any other DEA registration, be, and it hereby is, denied. This Order is effective immediately.[5]

Dated: September 28, 2017.

Chuck Rosenberg,

Acting Administrator.

[FR Doc. 2017–21380 Filed 10–4–17; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Foreign Claims Settlement Commission

[F.C.S.C. Meeting and Hearing Notice No. 9–17]

Sunshine Act Meeting

The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, pursuant to its regulations

[2] While this ground was not cited in the Show Cause Order, the Government provided constitutionally adequate notice that it was also seeking revocation on this basis when it served Respondent with its Motion for Summary Disposition and Respondent had a meaningful opportunity to put forward evidence and contest the issue. *See Hatem Ataya,* 81 FR 8221, 8244–45 (2016).

[3] As for Respondent's reliance on *Leishman* v. *Associated Wholesale Electric Co.,* that case involved a motion for amended findings under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and has no relevance to this matter.

[4] To the contrary, in his various filings, Respondent maintains that various agents ''misle[d] the grand jury to get the original indictment'' and that ''no warrants were issued for 19 videotaped visits.'' Resp.'s Hrng. Req., at 1.

[5] Based on Respondent's numerous convictions, I conclude that the public interest necessitates that this Order be effective immediately. 21 CFR 1316.67.

(45 CFR part 503.25) and the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. 552b), hereby gives notice in regard to the scheduling of open meetings as follows:

Thursday, October 19, 2017:

10:00 a.m.—Issuance of Proposed Decisions in claims against Iraq.

STATUS: Open.

All meetings are held at the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 600 E Street NW., Washington, DC. Requests for information, or advance notices of intention to observe an open meeting, may be directed to: Patricia M. Hall, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 600 E Street NW., Suite 6002, Washington, DC 20579. Telephone: (202) 616–6975.

Brian M. Simkin,

Chief Counsel.

[FR Doc. 2017–21613 Filed 10–3–17; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 4410–BA–P

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Notice of Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

On September 28, 2017, the Department of Justice lodged a Consent Decree with defendant Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, LLC (''Aramark'') in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Civil Action No. 3:17–cv–04062. The Consent Decree resolves a claim under Section 107(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (''CERCLA''), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2), for past response costs incurred in connection with the release of PCE at the Coyne Textile Services Superfund Site, located in Huntington, West Virginia. The Complaint filed concurrently with the Consent Decree alleges that Aramark, through a predecessor company, owned and operated an industrial laundry business at the Site from 1972 to 1982 that included a dry cleaning process that utilized perchloroethylene (''PERC'' or ''PCE''). The proposed consent decree obligates Aramark to reimburse $1.595 million of the United States' past response costs and provides Aramark a covenant not to sue for past response costs incurred through May 10, 2017. Aramark is performing the work at the Site pursuant to an administrative order and agreement with EPA, which addresses claims under Section 106(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9606(a), at the Site.

The publication of this notice opens a period for public comment on the Consent Decree. Comments should be addressed to the Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division, and should refer to *United States* v. *Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, LLC,* Civil Action No. 3:17–cv–04062 (S.D.W. Va.), DJ Ref. No. 90–11–3–11369. All comments must be submitted no later than 30 days after the publication date of this notice. Comments may be submitted either by email or by mail:

To submit comments:	*Send them to:*
By email	*pubcomment-ees.enrd@usdoj.gov.*
By mail	Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DOJ—ENRD, P.O. Box 7611, Washington, DC 20044–7611.

During the public comment period, the Consent Decree may be examined and downloaded at this Justice Department Web site: *https://www.justice.gov/enrd/consent-decrees.* We will provide a paper copy of the Consent Decree upon written request and payment of reproduction costs. Please mail your request and payment to: Consent Decree Library, U.S. DOJ—ENRD, P.O. Box 7611, Washington, DC 20044–7611.

Please enclose a check or money order for $6.00 (25 cents per page reproduction cost) payable to the United States Treasury. For a paper copy without the exhibits and signature pages, the cost is $5.25.

Jeffrey Sands,

Assistant Section Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division.

[FR Doc. 2017–21394 Filed 10–4–17; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–15–P

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

Workforce Information Advisory Council (WIAC)

AGENCY: Employment and Training Administration, Labor.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014 (WIOA), which amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, notice is hereby given that the WIAC will meet on November 1 and 2, 2017. The meeting will take place at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Janet Norwood Training and Conference Center in Washington, DC. The WIAC was established in accordance with provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), as amended and will act in accordance with the applicable provisions of FACA and its implementing regulation. The meeting will be open to the public.

DATES: The meeting will take place on Wednesday, November 1, and Thursday, November 2, 2017 from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Public statements and requests for special accommodations or to address the Advisory Council must be received by October 23, 2017.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held at the BLS Janet Norwood Training and Conference Center, Rooms 7 and 8, in the Postal Square Building at 2 Massachusetts Ave. NE., Washington, DC 20212.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Steven Rietzke, Chief, Division of National Programs, Tools, and Technical Assistance, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Room C–4510, 200 Constitution Ave. NW., Washington, DC 20210; Telephone: 202–693–3912. Mr. Rietzke is the Designated Federal Officer for the WIAC.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background: The WIAC is an important component of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act. The WIAC is a Federal Advisory Committee of workforce and labor market information experts representing a broad range of national, State, and local data and information users and producers. The purpose of the WIAC is to provide recommendations to the Secretary of Labor, working jointly through the Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training and the Commissioner of Labor Statistics, to address: (1) The evaluation and improvement of the nationwide workforce and labor market information (WLMI) system and statewide systems that comprise the nationwide system; and (2) how the Department and the States will cooperate in the management of those systems. These systems include programs to produce employment-related statistics and State and local workforce and labor market information.

The Department of Labor anticipates the WIAC will accomplish its objectives by: (1) Studying workforce and labor market information issues; (2) seeking and sharing information on innovative approaches, new technologies, and data to inform employment, skills training,