

Another commenter stated that “in most instances the money for the event has already been raised. Therefore, the candidate or officeholder’s appearance and speech [are] not a solicitation.”

Another commenter noted that most of these fundraising events are small-dollar events targeted at grass roots volunteers where donations are usually less than \$100, and do not include corporations or single-interest groups. An additional commenter stated that “Congress knew that state and local party committees request officeholders speak at party events to increase attendance and the party’s yield from the event. It was also aware that speeches at these events are unlikely of themselves to foster the quid pro quo contributions that the law seeks to curb.” Thus, many of these events already comply with amount limitations and source prohibitions for solicitation under section 441i(e)(1)(B). In contrast, other commenters asserted that there was a potential for abuse if Federal candidates and officeholders make phone calls from the event asking donors for non-Federal funds, or gather together a group of wealthy donors and label it a “State party fundraising event” in order to benefit from the exemption in section 300.64. However, in response to Commission questioning at the hearing, no commenter could point to any reports of such activity in the past election cycle. If the Commission detects evidence of abuse in the future, the Commission has the authority to revisit the regulation and take action as appropriate, including an approach targeted to the specific types of problems that are actually found to occur.

Additional Issues

1. Other Fundraising Events

In the NPRM, the Commission sought public comment regarding certain advisory opinions issued by the Commission permitting attendance and participation by Federal officeholders and candidates at events where non-Federal funds would be raised for State and local candidates or organizations, subject to various restrictions and disclaimer requirements. *See NPRM* at 9015; Advisory Opinions 2003–03, 2003–05, and 2003–36. Some commenters stated that the analysis in those advisory opinions was correct and consistent with BCRA’s exceptions permitting Federal officeholders and candidates to raise money for State and local elections within Federal limits and prohibitions under section 441i(e)(1)(B). One commenter noted that these advisory opinions were based on the

Commission’s regulation at 11 CFR 300.62, which was not challenged in the *Shays* litigation and need not be reexamined here. Another commenter urged the Commission to incorporate the holdings of these advisory opinions into its regulations so that Federal officeholders and candidates could continue to rely on them. One commenter also suggested that any additional restrictions beyond the disclaimers required in these advisory opinions would raise constitutional concerns. In contrast, other commenters asserted that these advisory opinions were incorrect and that the Commission should supersede them with a regulation that completely bars attendance at soft money fundraising events that are not hosted by a State party. The Commission does not believe it is necessary to initiate a rulemaking to address the issues in Advisory Opinions 2003–03, 2003–05, and 2003–36 at this time.

2. Levin Funds

The Commission also sought comment on how it should interpret 2 U.S.C. 441i(b)(2), (e)(1), and (e)(3) in light of language from *Shays* stating that Levin funds are “funds ‘subject to [FECA’s] limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements.’” *See NPRM* at 9016. Most comments regarding this inquiry opposed any interpretation of these provisions that would allow Federal officeholders and candidates to solicit Levin funds without restriction, with some commenters noting that the Commission has consistently referred to Levin funds as non-Federal funds, including in recent final rules published in 2005. However, one commenter stated that Federal officeholders and candidates should be allowed to raise Levin funds. This issue of interpretation was relevant only to the alternative approach proposed in the NPRM. Because the Commission has decided to retain its rule in section 300.64 with a revised Explanation and Justification, the Commission need not further address this question of statutory interpretation.

Dated: June 23, 2005.

Scott E. Thomas,

Chairman, Federal Election Commission.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 23

[Docket No. CE230, Special Condition 23–170–SC]

Special Conditions; Raytheon Model King Air H–90 (T–44A) Protection of Systems for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued to ARINC Inc., 1632 S. Murray Blvd., Colorado Springs, CO 80916 for a Supplemental Type Certificate for the Raytheon Model King Air H–90 (T–44A) airplane. These airplanes will have novel and unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisaged in the applicable airworthiness standards. The novel and unusual design features include the installation of the Rockwell Collins Pro Line 21 Avionics System. This system includes Electronic Flight Instrument Systems (EFIS), electronic displays, digital Air Data Computers (ADC), and supporting equipment. The applicable regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate airworthiness standards for the protection of these systems from the effects of high intensity radiated fields (HIRF). These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to the airworthiness standards applicable to these airplanes.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is June 22, 2005.

Comments must be received on or before August 1, 2005.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Regional Counsel, ACE–7, Attention: Rules Docket Clerk, Docket No. CE230, Room 506, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. All comments must be marked: Docket No. CE230. Comments may be inspected in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wes Ryan, Aerospace Engineer, Standards Office (ACE–110), Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 329–4127.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the approval and thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has been subject to the public comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. The FAA, therefore, finds that good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon issuance.

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to submit such written data, views, or arguments, as they may desire. Communications should identify the regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered by the Administrator. The special conditions may be changed in light of the comments received. All comments received will be available in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons, both before and after the closing date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking will be filed in the docket. Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must include a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. CE230." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Background

On June 7, 2005, ARINC Inc. 1632 S. Murray Blvd., Colorado Springs, CO 80916, notified the Denver ACO of a Designated Alteration Station (DAS) project for a new Supplemental Type Certificate for the Raytheon Model H90 (T-44A) airplanes. The Raytheon Models of concern are approved under TC No. 3A20. The proposed modification incorporates a novel or unusual design features, including a dual EFIS system, digital air data computers, and other equipment associated with the Rockwell Collins Pro Line 21 Avionics System. These systems may be vulnerable to HIRF external to the airplane.

Type Certification Basis

Under the provisions of 14 CFR part 21, § 21.101, ARINC, Inc. must show that the Raytheon Model H90 (T-44A)

airplanes meet the following provisions, or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the STC: For those areas modified or impacted by the installation, ARINC will use 14 CFR part 23 Amendments 23-1 through 23-55. This includes applying the concepts of 23.1301, 23.1302, 23.1309, 23.1311, 23.1321, 23.1322, 23.1331, 23.1335, 23.1351, 23.1357, 23.1359, 23.1361, 23.1365, 23.1367, 23.1381, 23.1431, 23.1529, 23.1541, 23.1543, 23.1581 at amendment 55, and the special conditions adopted by this rulemaking action. For systems that are not modified or impacted by the installation, the original certification basis listed on TC No. 3A20 are still applicable.

Discussion

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards because of novel or unusual design features of an airplane, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16.

Special conditions, as appropriate, as defined in § 11.19, are issued in accordance with § 11.38 after public notice and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with § 21.101.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the models for which they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model already included on the same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of § 21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

ARINC, Inc. plans to incorporate certain novel and unusual design features into an airplane for which the airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for protection from the effects of HIRF. These features include the addition of a digital Air Data computer, which may be susceptible to the HIRF environment, that were not envisaged by the existing regulations for this type of airplane.

Protection of Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF): Recent advances in technology have given rise to the application in aircraft designs of advanced electrical and electronic systems that perform functions required for continued safe flight and landing. Due to the use of sensitive solid-state advanced components in analog and digital electronics circuits, these advanced systems are readily responsive to the transient effects of induced

electrical current and voltage caused by the HIRF. The HIRF can degrade electronic systems performance by damaging components or upsetting system functions.

Furthermore, the HIRF environment has undergone a transformation that was not foreseen when the current requirements were developed. Higher energy levels are radiated from transmitters that are used for radar, radio, and television. Also, the number of transmitters has increased significantly. There is also uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, coupling to cockpit-installed equipment through the cockpit window apertures is undefined.

The combined effect of the technological advances in airplane design and the changing environment has resulted in an increased level of vulnerability of electrical and electronic systems required for the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. Effective measures against the effects of exposure to HIRF must be provided by the design and installation of these systems. The accepted maximum energy levels in which civilian airplane system installations must be capable of operating safely are based on surveys and analysis of existing radio frequency emitters. These special conditions require that the airplane be evaluated under these energy levels for the protection of the electronic system and its associated wiring harness. These external threat levels, which are lower than previous required values, are believed to represent the worst case to which an airplane would be exposed in the operating environment.

These special conditions require qualification of systems that perform critical functions, as installed in aircraft, to the defined HIRF environment in paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed value using laboratory tests, in paragraph 2, as follows:

(1) The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational capability of the installed electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF environment defined below:

Frequency	Field Strength (volts per meter)	
	Peak	Average
10 kHz–100 kHz	50	50
100 kHz–500 kHz	50	50
500 kHz–2 MHz	50	50
2 MHz–30 MHz	100	100
30 MHz–70 MHz	50	50

Frequency	Field Strength (volts per meter)	
	Peak	Average
70 MHz–100 MHz	50	50
100 MHz–200 MHz	100	100
200 MHz–400 MHz	100	100
400 MHz–700 MHz	700	50
700 MHz–1 GHz	700	100
1 GHz–2 GHz ...	2000	200
2 GHz–4 GHz ...	3000	200
4 GHz–6 GHz ...	3000	200
6 GHz–8 GHz ...	1000	200
8 GHz–12 GHz ...	3000	300
12 GHz–18 GHz ...	2000	200
18 GHz–40 GHz ...	600	200

The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak root-mean-square (rms) values.

or,

(2) The applicant may demonstrate by a system test and analysis that the electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions can withstand a minimum threat of 100 volts per meter, electrical field strength, from 10 kHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to show compliance with the HIRF requirements, no credit is given for signal attenuation due to installation.

A preliminary hazard analysis must be performed by the applicant, for approval by the FAA, to identify either electrical or electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term “critical” means those functions, whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. The systems identified by the hazard analysis that perform critical functions are candidates for the application of HIRF requirements. A system may perform both critical and non-critical functions. Primary electronic flight display systems, and their associated components, perform critical functions such as attitude, altitude, and airspeed indication. The HIRF requirements apply only to critical functions.

Compliance with HIRF requirements may be demonstrated by tests, analysis, models, similarity with existing systems, or any combination of these. Service experience alone is not acceptable since normal flight operations may not include an exposure to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a means of protection against the effects of external HIRF is generally insufficient since all elements of a redundant system are likely to be exposed to the fields concurrently.

Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to Raytheon Model H90 (T–44A) airplanes. Should ARINC, Inc. apply at a later date for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model on the same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. For this reason, and because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols.

Citation

■ The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

PART 23—[AMENDED]

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR 11.38 and 11.19.

The Special Conditions

■ Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the Raytheon Model 90 (T–44A) airplanes modified by ARINC, Inc. to add the Rockwell Collins Pro Line 21 Avionics System.

1. *Protection of Electrical and Electronic Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF).* Each system

that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operations, and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical functions, are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated electromagnetic fields external to the airplane.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies: *Critical Functions:* Functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on June 22, 2005.

John R. Colomy,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 23

[Docket No. 228, Special Condition 23–167–SC]

Special Conditions; Diamond Aircraft Industries, EFIS and Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) on the Diamond DA–42; Protection of Systems for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued to Diamond Aircraft Industries GmbH, N.A. Otto-Strasse 5, A–2700 Wiener Neustadt, Austria; telephone: 43 2622 26 700; facsimile: 43 2622 26 780, as part of the FAA Type Validation of the Diamond Aircraft Industries Model DA–42. This airplane will have novel and unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisaged in the applicable airworthiness standards. These novel and unusual design features include the installation of a Garmin Model G–1000 electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) display, and digital engine controls. The applicable regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate airworthiness standards for the protection of these systems from the effects of high intensity radiated fields (HIRF). These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety