

Census and will present them to the GU. The cost of a Special Census varies depending on the GU's housing and population counts and whether a government requests a full or partial Special Census. The cost estimate outlines the anticipated costs to the sponsoring government for staffing, materials, data processing and tabulation. Included with the cost estimate is a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Once a signed MOA and initial payment are transmitted to the Census Bureau, the Special Census process will begin. When data collection, processing, disclosure avoidance, and tabulation have been completed, the GU will receive official census statistics on the population and housing unit counts for the entire jurisdiction or parts of the jurisdiction, as defined in the MOA at the beginning of the Special Census process. All Special Census statistics will be subject to disclosure avoidance using differential privacy methods, consistent with the processes and methods used for 2020 Census data products, prior to their release to the public. Requests for cost estimates from GUs will be accepted through May 2027.

## II. Method of Collection

The Census Bureau plans to use an internet self-response instrument for respondents to respond online to the Special Census questionnaire. Respondents will have a number of weeks to respond to the Special Census questionnaire using the internet self-response instrument. At the start of the Special Census, the Census Bureau will send an invitation letter to housing units in the GU's Special Census area with information needed to respond online. Reminder letters and postcards will be sent to each housing unit to encourage self-response and provide information needed to do so.

Approximately two weeks after the end of the Special Census self-response period, the Census Bureau will conduct follow-up operations in the field to enumerate housing units that did not respond using the internet self-response instrument. Housing units that do not respond online will be contacted by a field representative who will conduct a Special Census interview using a paper questionnaire. The field operations will also enumerate group quarters and transitory locations in the GU's Special Census area. The Census Bureau plans to use a paper questionnaire to conduct Special Census interviews at transitory locations and group quarters. During the field operations, Special Census field representatives will also update the addresses of living quarters as needed,

based on their observation of housing units, transitory locations, and group quarters.

Several quality assurance measures will be implemented for each Special Census to ensure that high quality data are gathered using the most efficient and cost-effective procedures. These include edits incorporated into the online questionnaire and the ability to validate potentially erroneous responses in the field. Independent quality assurance checks and reinterview of a sample of field questionnaires will also be implemented to ensure the quality of the data collected in the field.

As the Census Bureau develops automated tools and methods for data collection and listing for the 2030 Decennial Census, the Special Census Program may incorporate this additional automation throughout the decade. Updates to the operational design will be implemented no earlier than 2026. The incorporation of additional automation may increase data collection quality and efficiency, resulting in a cost savings for GUs, but the extent of those cost savings is currently unknown.

## III. Data

*OMB Control Number:* 0607–0368.

*Form Number(s):* SC–Q, SC–CQ, SC–Q–TL, SC–CQ–TL, SC–Q–GE, SC–RQ, SC–900 RCE.

*Type of Review:* Regular submission, Request for a Reinstatement, with Change, of a Previously Approved Collection.

*Affected Public:* Individuals or households; State, Local, or Tribal government.

*Estimated Number of Respondents:* 340,000.

*Estimated Time per Response:* approximately 10 minutes.

*Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours:* 56,667.

*Estimated Total Annual Cost to Public:* \$0. (This is not the cost of respondents' time, but the indirect costs respondents may incur for such things as purchases of specialized software or hardware needed to report, or expenditures for accounting or records maintenance services required specifically by the collection.)

*Respondent's Obligation:* Voluntary.

*Legal Authority:* Title 13 U.S.C. Section 196.

## IV. Request for Comments

We are soliciting public comments to permit the Department/Bureau to: (a) Evaluate whether the proposed information collection is necessary for the proper functions of the Department, including whether the information will

have practical utility; (b) Evaluate the accuracy of our estimate of the time and cost burden for this proposed collection, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used; (c) Evaluate ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (d) Minimize the reporting burden on those who are to respond, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

Comments that you submit in response to this notice are a matter of public record. We will include, or summarize, each comment in our request to OMB to approve this ICR. Before including your address, phone number, email address, or other personal identifying information in your comment, you should be aware that your entire comment—including your personal identifying information—may be made publicly available at any time. While you may ask us in your comment to withhold your personal identifying information from public review, we cannot guarantee that we will be able to do so.

**Sheleen Dumas,**

*Department PRA Clearance Officer, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Commerce Department.*

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**BILLING CODE 3510–07–P**

## DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

### Bureau of Industry and Security

#### Rossiya Airlines, Pilotov St 18–4, St. Petersburg, Russia, 196210; Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2021) (“EAR” or “the Regulations”),<sup>1</sup> the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), U.S.

<sup>1</sup> On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (“ECRA”). While Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401 *et seq.* (“EAA”), (except for three sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.* (“IEEPA”), and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5).

Department of Commerce, through its Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”), has requested the issuance of an Order temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges under the Regulations of Russian airline Rossiya Airlines (“Rossiya”). OEE’s request and related information indicates that Rossiya is headquartered in St. Petersburg, Russia, and Aeroflot Russian Airlines JSC, a/k/a PJSC Aeroflot (“Aeroflot”) is Rossiya’s majority shareholder.<sup>2</sup> The Russian Federal Government is the majority owner of Aeroflot, through its Federal Agency for State Property Management.

**I. Legal Standard**

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily denying a respondent’s export privileges upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an “imminent violation” of the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). “A violation may be ‘imminent’ either in time or degree of likelihood.” 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show “either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.” *Id.* As to the likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge “is significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]” *Id.* A “lack of information establishing the precise

time a violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a violation.” *Id.*

**II. OEE’s Request for a Temporary Denial Order (“TDO”)**

The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian Federation’s (“Russia’s”) further invasion of Ukraine by implementing a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict Russia’s access to technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily target Russia’s defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are intended to cut off Russia’s access to vital technological inputs, atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia’s strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage. Effective February 24, 2022, BIS imposed expansive controls on aviation-related (e.g., Commerce Control List Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia, including a license requirement for the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts specified in Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 9A991 (Section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).<sup>3</sup> BIS will review any export or reexport license applications for such items under a policy of denial. *See* Section 746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS excluded any aircraft registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia from being eligible for license

exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (AVS) (Section 740.15 of the EAR).<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, any U.S.-origin aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin content, and that is registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia, is subject to a license requirement before it can travel to Russia.

OEE’s request is based upon facts indicating that Rossiya engaged in recent conduct prohibited by the Regulations by operating aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991 on flights into Russia after March 2, 2022, without the required BIS authorization.

Specifically, OEE’s investigation, including publicly available flight tracking information, indicates that after March 2, 2022, Rossiya operated multiple U.S.-origin aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, those identified below, on flights into and out of Moscow, Russia and St. Petersburg, Russia from/to Sharjah, United Arab Emirates; Tel Aviv, Israel; and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Pursuant to Section 746.8 of the EAR, all of these flights would have required export or reexport licenses from BIS. Rossiya flights would not be eligible to use license exception AVS. No BIS authorizations were either sought or obtained by Rossiya for these exports or reexports to Russia. The information about those flights includes the following:

Tail No.	Serial No.	Aircraft type	Departure/arrival cities	Dates
VQ–BVU .....	41202	737–8LJ (B738)	Sharjah, AE/Moscow, RU .....	March 7, 2022.
VP–BUS .....	44435	737–8MC (B738)	Tel Aviv, IL/St. Petersburg, RU .....	March 3, 2022.
VP–BUS .....	44435	737–8MC (B738)	Dubai, AE/St. Petersburg, RU .....	March 4, 2022.
VP–BUS .....	44435	737–8MC (B738)	Dubai, AE/St. Petersburg, RU .....	March 5, 2022.
VP–BUS .....	44435	737–8MC (B738)	Dubai, AE/St. Petersburg, RU .....	March 6, 2022.
VQ–BWJ .....	41212	737–8LJ (B738)	Sharm el-Sheikh, EG/St. Petersburg, RU .....	March 6, 2022.
EI–XLH .....	27650	747–446 (B744)	Hurghada, EG/Moscow, RU .....	March 8, 2022.

Based on this information, there are heightened concerns of future violations of the EAR, given that any subsequent actions taken with regard to any of the

listed aircraft, or other Rossiya aircraft illegally exported or reexported to Russia after March 2, 2022, may violate the EAR. Such actions include, but are

not limited to, refueling, maintenance, repair, or the provision of spare parts or services. *See* General Prohibition 10 of the EAR at 15 CFR 736.2(b)(10).<sup>5</sup> Even

<sup>2</sup> Aeroflot is the subject of a Temporary Denial Order issued on April 8, 2022. *See* 87 FR 21611 (April 12, 2022).

<sup>3</sup> 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). Additionally, BIS published a final rule effective April 8, 2022, which imposed licensing requirements on items controlled on the Commerce Control List (“CCL”) under Categories 0–2 that are destined for Russia or Belarus. Accordingly, now all CCL items require export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) licenses if destined for or within Russia or Belarus. 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022).

<sup>4</sup> 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022).

<sup>5</sup> Section 736.2(b)(10) of the EAR provides: General Prohibition Ten—Proceeding with transactions with knowledge that a violation has occurred or is about to occur (Knowledge Violation to Occur). You may not sell, transfer, export, reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use, loan, dispose of, transport, forward, or otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item subject to the EAR and exported or to be exported with knowledge that a violation of the Export Administration Regulations, the Export

Administration Act or any order, license, License Exception, or other authorization issued thereunder has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to occur in connection with the item. Nor may you rely upon any license or License Exception after notice to you of the suspension or revocation of that license or exception. There are no License Exceptions to this General Prohibition Ten in part 740 of the EAR. (emphasis in original).

Rossiya's continued use of such U.S.-origin aircraft only on domestic routes within Russia runs afoul of General Prohibition 10, which (among other restrictions) prohibits the continued use of an item that was known to have been exported or reexported in violation of the EAR. For example, publicly available flight tracking data shows that, between April 14 and April 15, 2022, aircraft VQ-BVU (SN: 41202), VP-BUS (SN: 44435), and VQ-BWJ (SN: 41212) flew on flights into and out of St. Petersburg, Russia to/from Kaliningrad, Russia, Sochi, Russia, Omsk, Russia, Kazan, Russia, and Moscow, Russia, respectively.

Moreover, additional concerns of future violations of the Regulations are raised by public information indicating efforts by Rossiya to have aircraft re-registered in Russia and assigned Russian tail numbers, suggesting that Rossiya intends not only to maintain control over the aircraft but also to continue operating them in likely violation of the EAR. Specifically, a public statement dated March 30, 2022, and available as of the signing of this order states "Rossiya completes the process of transferring aircraft to Russian jurisdiction."<sup>6</sup> Publicly available information further shows, for example, that in March 2022, Rossiya re-registered a U.S.-origin 747 (SN: 27100) in Russia and assigned the aircraft Russian tail number RA-73283.<sup>7</sup> Given BIS's review policy of denial under Section 746.8(a) of the Regulations for exports and reexports to Russia, it is foreseeable that Rossiya will attempt to evade the Regulations in order to obtain new or additional aircraft parts for or service its existing aircraft that were exported or reexported to Russia in violation of Section 746.8 of the Regulations.

### III. Findings

Under the applicable standard set forth in Section 766.24 of the Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that Rossiya took actions in apparent violation of the Regulations by exporting or reexporting the aircraft cited above, among many others, on flights into Russia after March 2, 2022, without the required BIS authorization. Moreover, the continued operation of these aircraft by Rossiya, even on domestic routes within Russia, and the company's on-going need to acquire

replacement parts and components, many of which are U.S.-origin, presents a high likelihood of imminent violations warranting imposition of a TDO. Additionally, given that Rossiya and its majority shareholder Aeroflot both own and operate a number of similar models of U.S.-origin aircraft requiring the same spare parts, I find it necessary to issue this Order not only to prevent further violations involving Rossiya's aircraft but also to prevent evasion of the Aeroflot TDO that I issued on April 8, 2022. I further find that such apparent violations have been "significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]" Therefore, issuance of the TDO is necessary in the public interest to prevent imminent violation of the Regulations and to give notice to companies and individuals in the United States and abroad that they should avoid dealing with Rossiya, in connection with export and reexport transactions involving items subject to the Regulations and in connection with any other activity subject to the Regulations.

This Order is being issued on an *ex parte* basis without a hearing based upon BIS's showing of an imminent violation in accordance with Section 766.24 and 766.23(b) of the Regulations.

### IV. Order

*It is therefore ordered:*

*First*, Rossiya Airlines, Pilotov St 18-4, St. Petersburg, Russia, 196210, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as "item") exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;

B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and

authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or

C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.

*Second*, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of Rossiya any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by Rossiya of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby Rossiya acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from Rossiya of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

D. Obtain from Rossiya in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or

E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by Rossiya, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Rossiya if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.

*Third*, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Rossiya by

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.rossiya-airlines.com/en/about/news/rossiya-completes-the-process-of-transferring-aircraft-to-russian-jurisdiction/>.

<sup>7</sup> The aircraft was previously registered in Ireland with tail number EI-XLC.

ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

In accordance with the provisions of Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Rossiya may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be opposed by Rossiya as provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days before the expiration date of the Order.

A copy of this Order shall be provided to Rossiya and shall be published in the **Federal Register**.

This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for 180 days.

Dated: May 20, 2022.

**Matthew S. Axelrod**,  
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 2022-11214 Filed 5-24-22; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

### International Trade Administration

#### Notice of Scope Rulings

**AGENCY:** Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce.

**SUMMARY:** The Department of Commerce (Commerce) hereby publishes a list of scope rulings and anti-circumvention determinations made during the period January 1, 2022, through March 31, 2022. We intend to publish future lists after the close of the next calendar quarter.

**DATES:** Applicable May 25, 2022.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Marcia E. Short, AD/CVD Operations, Customs Liaison Unit, Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: 202-482-1560.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Background

Commerce regulations provide that it will publish in the **Federal Register** a list of scope rulings on a quarterly basis.<sup>1</sup> Our most recent notification of scope rulings was published on February 9, 2022.<sup>2</sup> This current notice covers all scope rulings and anti-circumvention determinations made by Enforcement and Compliance from January 1, 2022, through March 31, 2022.

#### *Scope Rulings Made January 1, 2022, Through March 31, 2022*

##### Mexico

A-201-820: Fresh Tomatoes From Mexico

*Requestor:* Simply Fresh, LLC. Fresh Roma tomatoes for processing that are preserved by a commercial process using chemical additives, used in Simply Fresh LLC's salsa products, are outside the scope of the suspension agreement and the suspended investigation; January 12, 2022.

##### People's Republic of China (China)

A-570-073 and C-570-074: Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet From China

*Requestor:* Hammond Power Solutions, Inc. Specially processed, beveled aluminum foil conductor for transformer coil windings is covered by the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on common alloy aluminum sheet (CAAS) because the further processing performed on the CAAS in Canada would neither remove the CAAS from the scope of the orders if it were performed in China, nor constitutes "substantial transformation" that renders the resulting product a product of Canada; January 20, 2022.

A-570-051 and C-570-052: Certain Hardwood Plywood Products From China

*Requestor:* EAPA Referral from U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Two-ply panels produced in China are covered by the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on certain hardwood plywood products (hardwood plywood) from China. The hardwood plywood that Vietnam Finewood Company Limited exported to the United States, which was assembled in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam) using two-ply panels imported from China, are Chinese country of origin because the two-ply panels are not substantially

transformed by the processing occurring in Vietnam; January 21, 2022.

A-570-929: Small Diameter Graphite Electrodes From China

*Requestor:* Boart Longyear Company. The graphite rods subject to the request are within the scope of the antidumping duty order on small diameter graphite electrodes from China because the products have the same physical characteristics as unfinished small diameter graphite electrodes and can be machined into graphite pin joining systems, *i.e.*, subject merchandise, after importation; February 1, 2022.

A-570-967 and C-570-968: Aluminum Extrusions From China

*Requestor:* Discount Ramps.com LLC. The aluminum extrusions within Discount Ramps.com LLC's bogie wheel kit are covered by the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from China because they are made from an Aluminum Association 6-series alloy, and the bogie wheel kit does not meet the criteria for the scope exclusion for finished goods kits because it does not contain, at the time of importation, all of the necessary parts to fully assemble a final finished good; February 4, 2022.

##### Taiwan

A-583-869: Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires From Taiwan

*Requestor:* Cheng Shin Rubber Ind. Col Ltd. Three models of light-truck tires are not covered by the scope of the antidumping duty order on passenger vehicle and light truck tires from Taiwan because they have been designed and marketed exclusively for use as temporary-use spare tires for light trucks and meet the additional technical requirements under the fifth exclusion of the scope; February 14, 2022.

#### Notification to Interested Parties

Interested parties are invited to comment on the completeness of this list of completed scope inquiries and anti-circumvention determinations made during the period January 1, 2022, through March 31, 2022. Any comments should be submitted to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations, Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, via email to [CommerceCLU@trade.gov](mailto:CommerceCLU@trade.gov).

This notice is published in accordance with 19 CFR 351.225(o).

<sup>1</sup> See 19 CFR 351.225(o).

<sup>2</sup> See *Notice of Scope Rulings*, 87 FR 7425 (February 9, 2022).